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ABUSED, NEGLECTED, AND ABANDONED BY
STATE JUVENILE COURTS: THE CALL FOR
REFORM IN SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE
STATUS
I. INTRODUCTION
Abused, neglected, and abandoned, two natives of Guadalajara, ages
five and seven, began their journey to the United States.1 Just two years
prior, the boys’ father abandoned them to travel to the United States, while
the boys remained with their mother, a drug dealer, and stepfather who
routinely beat them with extension cords, belts, and anything else that he
could get his hands on. While the boys did not endure abuse from their
mother, she failed to protect them from the harsh treatment of their
stepfather. The boys were only allowed to leave when their mother and
stepfather were killed by a rival drug gang. As a result, the boys took the
treacherous journey to the United States—hitchhiking, riding with
strangers, and no adult supervision.
The boys were captured at the United States-Mexico border, kept in a
Texas juvenile facility for three months, and then released into their
biological father’s custody, who lived in Nebraska. After several months,
the boys petitioned the Nebraska Family Court for special findings to
apply for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (“SIJS”), which is a remedy
available to abused, abandoned, and neglected children, but their petition
was denied.2 However, if the boys were in New York, the outcome would
have been different and they would be granted a juvenile court order in
support of SIJS.3 If the undocumented child receives SIJS, he or she will
be able to transfer SIJS to receive legal permanent resident status in the
United States.4

The following is a fictional work created by the author solely for the purpose of this
Note.
2
See infra Part II.D.2 (reviewing In re Erick M., a Nebraska Supreme Court decision that
denied a teenage boy’s motion for SIJS approval for failure to prove that his request was bona
fide); see also Emily Rose Gonzalez, Battered Immigrant Youth Take the Beat: Special Immigrant
Juveniles Permitted to Age-Out of Status, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUS. 409, 410 (2009) (revealing that
SIJS was created to give legal citizenship to abandoned, abused, and neglected children).
3
See infra Part II.C (describing current SIJS statutory requirements).
4
See ANGIE JUNCK ET AL., SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS AND OTHER IMMIGRATION
OPTIONS FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH 3-10–3-11 (3d ed. 2010) (demonstrating that the greatest
benefit of SIJS is obtaining legal permanent resident status, also known as a green card, which
allows recipients to live and work permanently in the United States, to travel in and out of
the country, protection against deportation, and employment authorization). There are
dangers associated with SIJS, such as having the SIJS petition denied which alerts U.S.
immigration officials that the child is in the United States “illegally.” Id. at 3-11.
1

185

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 [2015], Art. 6

186

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

During the summer of 2014, there were approximately 60,000
unaccompanied children who entered the United States by crossing the
United States-Mexico border.5 An unaccompanied child is defined as a
child without lawful status in the United States, under the age of eighteen,
and has no parent or legal guardian in the United States that is able to
provide essential care and physical custody for that child.6 The nationalist
response to massive influxes of unaccompanied children is that “they are
illegal” and should be deported; however, before deportation, there is an
opportunity for a child to receive SIJS if he or she can prove to be abused,
abandoned, or neglected.7
In order to successfully complete the entire SIJS process, the child
must prevail over substantial procedural hurdles. 8 First, the child must

See Steve Chapman, When Kids Come Over the Border, CHI. TRIB. (July 6, 2014),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-07-06/news/ct-oped-chapman-0706-20140706_1_
human-trafficking-unaccompanied-children-foreigners
[http://perma.cc/3PNR-Y2YQ]
(unraveling America’s fear in having thousands of undocumented youth in the United
States); Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael D. Shear, 57,000 Reasons Immigration Overhaul May
Be Stalled For Now, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
07/17/us/politics/border-crisis-casts-shadow-over-obamas-immigration-plan.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/6F59-7WXL] (analyzing President Obama’s proposal to allow more
immigrants into the country, which may be halted as more undocumented children arrive in
the United States).
6
JUNCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 1-15. Junck states:
There are many unresolved issues around the “unaccompanied minor”
classification including the jurisdiction to make and review such a
decision, interpretation of the unaccompanied definition by federal
agencies, the process and timing of such a determination, and rescission
of TVPRA benefits if an unaccompanied classification is subsequently
revoked.
Id. Agencies have the authority to make determinations for who qualifies as unaccompanied.
Id.
7
See Devon A. Corneal, On the Way to Grandmother’s House: Is U.S. Immigration Policy
More Dangerous than the Big Bad Wolf for Unaccompanied Juvenile Aliens?, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV.
609, 619 (2004) (explaining deportation, which is now referred to as a removal proceeding);
Rachel Lienesch, Almost Half of Americans Want Undocumented Kids Deported Right Away,
HUFF. POST (July 16, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/16/immigrationpoll_n_5589010.html [http://perma.cc/24QW-ELDL] (explaining American antiimmigration sentiments). Many Americans believe that the increase in undocumented
children fleeing to the United States is not due to crime or unsafe conditions in their native
countries, but a hope to be granted amnesty by the American government. Lienesch, supra
note 7.
8
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i)–(ii) (2012) (enumerating the eligibility requirements to
obtain SIJS); see also Jennifer Baum et al., Most in Need but Least Served: Legal and Practical
Barriers to Special Immigrant Status, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 621, 621 (2012) (conveying the types of
barriers for children seeking SIJS); Angie Junck, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: Relief for
Neglected, Abused, and Abandoned Undocumented Children, 63 JUV. AND FAM. CT. J. 48, 61–62
(2012) (advocating for child representatives to minimize the procedural hurdles for
undocumented children seeking relief).
5
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receive “special findings” from the juvenile court.9 Only then can the child
apply for SIJS through the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”).10 After receiving “special findings,” the child is able to petition
the government to obtain legal permanent residency status.11
In addition to the procedural hurdles, the SIJS statute creates a
bifurcated process between the state and federal government. 12 Although
immigration is a federal issue, states are allowed to regulate child welfare
and are responsible for making preliminary determinations for SIJS
eligibility.13 Most recently, the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (“TVPRA 2008”) provided an
amended definition of SIJS that allows children who may not be reunited
with one or more parent to be eligible for the remedy.14 However, states
Baum et al., supra note 8, at 622. There are other instances where a child may petition
the USCIS for SIJS, such as being in Immigration and Naturalization Services (“INS”)
custody. Gregory Zhong Tian Chen, Elian or Alien? The Contradictions of Protecting
Undocumented Children under the Special Immigrant Juvenile Statute, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
597, 607 (2000). However, once in INS custody, state juvenile courts are no longer able to
gain jurisdiction over that child. Id. at 613. As a result, these children are often denied SIJS.
Id. In 1998, Congress clarified its intent for SIJS to apply to all abused, neglected, and
abandoned undocumented children. Dep’t of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary,
and Related Agencies Appropriates Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat. 2440 (1997).
10
See Angela Lloyd, Regulating Consent: Protecting Undocumented Immigrant Children from
Their (Evil) Step-Uncle Sam, or How to Ameliorate the Impact of the 1997 Amendments to the SIJ
Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 237, 238–39 n.10 (2006) (defining the USCIS’ role in the SIJS
process). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 divided the Immigration and Nationality
Service into two distinct agencies with the purpose of creating a separation of powers in the
INS. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq.). The USCIS is
responsible for handling immigration benefits, while the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Agency is responsible for border control and enforcement issues. Id.
11
See Jared Ryan Anderson, Yearning to be Free: Advancing the Rights of Undocumented
Children Through the Improvement of the Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) Status Procedure, 16 ST.
MARY’S L. REV. 659, 668–69 (2014) (examining the complexities of the SIJS process).
12
See infra Part II (weighing the bifurcation of the SIJS process).
13
See Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a “Best Interests of the Child” Approach Into Immigration
Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120, 124 (2009) (observing the jurisdictional
splits in the current “best interest of the child” approach); infra Part II.A (analyzing the
Immigration Act of 1990, which is the beginning of SIJS).
14
H.R. 7311, 110th Cong. (2008). The statute reads as follows:
(1) IN GENERAL—Section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J)) is amended—
(A) in clause (i), by striking “State and who has been deemed eligible by
that court for long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect, or
abandonment;” and inserting “State, or an individual or entity
appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and
whose reunification with one or both of the immigrant’s parents is not
viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found
under State law.”
Id. See infra Part II.D (recognizing the current controversy created by TVPRA 2008’s change
in the SIJS statutory language).
9
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differ on SIJS statutory interpretation.15 The current state juvenile court’s
discretion in interpreting the SIJS statute results in outcome disparities
between similarly situated children, which is contrary to the role of the
state in determining the best interests of the child. 16
This Note examines the differing interpretations of SIJS petitions and
the injustice that is placed on children.17 First, Part II describes the
implementation of SIJS with respect to the amendments occurring since
its enactment.18 Second, Part III analyzes the differing approaches that
state juvenile courts take in interpreting the SIJS statute, while evaluating
the adequacy of those approaches in light of the plain meaning rule and
unwarranted disparities that result for similarly situated children. 19
Finally, Part IV proposes an amendment to the SIJS statute, which gives
concrete definitions and further clarification of ambiguous terms to create
uniformity in the SIJS statute application at the state level. 20
II. BACKGROUND
Until recently, the number of undocumented children within the
United States went unnoticed; however, “illegal” immigration from the
southern border has long been a problem in the United States.21 SIJS is a
15
See infra Part III.C (observing that J.E., J.C., and Erick were children in the custody of
their mothers; however, Nebraska decided that Erick could not obtain SIJS); see, e.g., H.S.P.
v. J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 269 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (holding that the 2008 amendments
to the SIJS statute did not alter the intent of the 1997 federal law, which limited eligible SIJS
applicants to those with bona fide claims).
16
See infra Part II.C (noting the changes to the SIJS statute with respect to the complexities
in statutory interpretation among the states). See also David B. Thronson, You Can’t Get Here
from Here, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y L. 58, 61 (2006) (explaining the issues that immigrant children
face as a result of their parents’ choice to migrate to the United States). These children are
burdened by the shifting nature of immigration laws and are unable to find security or
stability to build a future. Id. at 66–67. These complexities should be considered to develop
a child-centered approach in determining SIJS eligibility. Id. at 61.
17
See infra Part II.D.2 (explaining the outcome disparities for children when petitioning
the juvenile court for special findings).
18
See infra Part II (discussing the implementation of SIJS with respect to the amendments
that shifted the purpose of SIJS).
19
See infra Part III (analyzing differing interpretations with some courts’ reliance on
legislative history).
20
See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to the current SIJS statute).
21
See Tamar Diana Wilson,
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment and the Problem of
Reproduction/Maintenance in Mexican Immigration to the United States, 20 CRITIQUE OF
ANTHROPOLOGY 191, 199 (2000) (explaining the attraction of U.S. social capita amongst
relatives and friends of immigrants that have migrated to the United States); Jamelle Bouie,
America’s Long History of Immigrant Scaremongering, SLATE.COM (July 18, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/07/immigrant_scaremo
ngering_and_hate_conservatives_stoke_fears_of_diseased.html [http://perma.cc/UJ2WD7CW] (reviewing the tradition of conservative political figures using disease and public
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form of relief for undocumented children that was available for just over
two decades.22 Because national security is a federal issue and child
welfare is a state issue, the SIJS statute utilizes a bifurcated system. 23
However, this dual relationship creates confusion, outcome disparities,
and a lack of empathy for the children in need of the SIJS remedy. 24
Part II.A introduces Section 153 of the Immigration Act of 1990.25
Next, Part II.B gives an in-depth history of Section 113 of the Immigration
Act of 1997, which accounts for the current differing interpretations. 26
Then, Part II.C introduces TVPRA 2008 and the resulting changes to SIJS.27
Finally, Part II.D analyzes the current controversy in state SIJS
interpretation with respect to the outcome disparities for similarly
situated children.28
health risk tactics to stir up anti-immigration sentiment); Lauren Fox, Anti-Immigrant Hate
Coming From Everyday Americans, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 24, 2014),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/07/24/anti-immigrant-hate-coming-fromeveryday-americans [http://perma.cc/9B5L-CPV7] (rendering that the frustration with the
current immigration system is not coming from hate groups but U.S. citizens). Citizens are
particularly concerned that new immigration detention centers will be placed in their
communities since the government stated an intent to create new centers away from the
border. Fox, supra note 21.
22
See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012)) (defining the first SIJS regulations). Because SIJS is relatively
new, SIJS continues to be underutilized. Kristen Jackson, Special Status Seekers: Through the
Underused SIJS Process, Immigrant Juveniles May Obtain Legal Status, LOS ANGELES LAWYER 20,
22 (2012), http://www.lacba.org/Files/LAL/Vol34No11/2893.pdf [http://perma.cc/
RE3V-4LFJ]. In 2010, out of 1,042,625 people that became lawful permanent residents of the
United States, only 1492 children gained residency through the SIJS remedy, which is less
than one percent. Id.
23
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (vesting Congress with the power to “provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United States”). Training, maintaining, and organizing
the navy, militia, and armed forces are included in the scope of legislative power. Id. See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States.”); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
303 (1993) (recounting the state’s interest in promoting child welfare); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (acknowledging the states “parens patriae interest in preserving and
promoting the welfare of the child”); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)
(clarifying that states have an “urgent” interest in child welfare).
24
See infra Part II.D.2 (addressing the disparities in SIJS “special findings” determinations
at the juvenile court). See also In re Israel O., 233 Cal. App. 4th 279, 291 (1st Dist. 2015)
(reversing and remanding a juvenile court’s order denying Israel’s request for SIJS).
25
See infra Part II.A (introducing the SIJS statute as an advancement to children and the
law).
26
See infra Part II.B (introducing the SIJS amendment of 1997).
27
See infra Part II.C (introducing TVPRA 2008, which broadened the pool of applicants
eligible for SIJS).
28
See infra Part II.D (describing the bifurcation of SIJS). Some courts make determinations
beyond the scope of the SIJ statute; however, “[t]he ‘state court’s role in the SIJ process is not
to determine worthy candidates for citizenship, but simply to identify abused, neglected, or
abandoned alien children under its jurisdiction who cannot reunify with a parent or be safely
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A. The Creation of Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: Immigration Act of
1990, Section 153
In 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA” or “Act”) placed
the first restrictions on migration into the United States through the
United States-Mexico border.29 Though there were many changes to the
Act, the Act did not differentiate between undocumented children and
undocumented adults.30 During this time, undocumented children
remained in state care until their undocumented parents came forward. 31
There were few remedies available to undocumented children before SIJS,
but there was asylum.32 Asylum is a remedy available to adult and child
refugees who fear persecution on “account of race, religion, nationality,

returned in their best interest to their home country.’” Simbaina v. Bunay, 109 A.3d 191, 202
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (quoting Leslie H. v. Cal. Sup. Ct., 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729, 737 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2014)).
29
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. (2012)). INA 1990 increased the numerical limitation (quota) of the
number of immigrants who could legally immigrate to the United States by thirty-five
percent. Charles C. Foster, The New Immigration Act of 1990: Major Reform of Legal Immigration,
28 HOUS. LAWYER 26–27 (Feb. 1991). Additionally, INA 1990 increased the number of visas
available to spouses and children of immigrants with certain status in the United States, and
provided a numerical immigrant quota for underrepresented countries. Id. at 29–30.
30
See generally Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965)
(abolishing the national quota system that was in play since the 1920s as a result of the
Emergency Quota Act, and replaced it with a system that preferred skilled immigrants);
Immigration and Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (giving
undocumented aliens the opportunity to gain legal status into the U.S.); Katherine Porter, In
the Best Interests of the INS: An Analysis of the 1997 Amendment to the Special Immigrant Juvenile
Law, 27 J. LEGIS. 441, 443 (2001) (revealing that INA 1986’s “benefits were severely restricted
to only a limited number of aliens who had been in the United States before 1982”); see also
M. Beth Morales Singh, To Rescue, Not Return: An International Human Rights Approach to
Protecting Child Economic Migrants Seeking Refuge in the United States, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 511, 526 (2008) (addressing some of the issues with children seeking refuge in the
United States).
31
See JUNCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 4-1 (explaining the considerations involved when
undocumented parents come forward to claim their undocumented children); Julian W.
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909) (advocating for appropriate legal
distinctions between children and adults).
32
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2013) (presenting the current asylum eligibility requirements). The
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees created asylum by stating:
[T]he United States is bound not to return to his or her home country
any individual who, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group or political opinion,” is outside of the country of the
individual’s nationality and is “unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling
to avail” himself or herself of the protection of the home country.
Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved But Still Unfair, 16
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 7 (2001).
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membership in a particular social group, or political opinion[.]”33
However, there was no distinction made between adult and children
refugees.34
Section 153 of the Immigration Act of 1990 (“SIJS 1990”) recognized
the issue that asylum posed to undocumented children by allowing
children who were victims of abuse, abandonment, or neglect the
opportunity to receive lawful permanent residency status.35 For SIJS
eligibility in 1990: (1) there had to be a court dependency order; (2) the
immigrant child had to be deemed eligible for long-term foster care; and
(3) it had to be in the child’s best interest not to be returned to the child’s
country of nationality.36 If the child welfare system and the state juvenile
33
8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2013). See In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358–60 (BIA 1996)
(granting a nineteen year old woman’s request for asylum due to fear that she would endure
female genital mutilation upon marrying the man selected by her father); Maura M. Ooi,
Unaccompanied Should Not Mean Unprotected: The Inadequacies of Relief for Unaccompanied
Immigrant Minors, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 883, 889 (2011) (discussing TVPRA 2008’s
improvement to asylum); Peter J. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 39 (1984) (defining refugees as “individuals displaced from their homes and
countries by convulsive events such as civil war, persecution, natural disaster, and
unimaginable destitution”); What is Asylum?, FREE ADVICE, http://immigrationlaw.freeadvice.com/immigration-law/asylum/what_is_asylum.htm
[http://perma.cc/
D849-YRQN] (relaying that asylum petitioners are seeking relief from deportation due to
entering the United States undocumented).
34
See Jacqueline Bhabha, “Not a Sack of Potatoes”: Moving and Removing Children Across
Borders, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 197, 199 (2006) (reporting that children seeking asylum were
viewed as independent agents who made the choice to migrate); Rachel Bien, Nothing to
Declare But Their Childhood: Reforming U.S. Asylum Law to Protect the Rights of Children, 12 J.L.
& POL’Y 797, 816 (2004) (observing that asylum law did not distinguish between children and
adults); Crystal Estrada, Misperceived Child Testimony: Why Credibility Should Be Presumed for
Unaccompanied and Separated Children Seeking Asylum, 31 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 121, 125–26
(2008) (insisting that U.S. asylum law fails to address persecution from a child’s perspective).
35
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978. Though INA 1990
provided rights for undocumented children, it also had a political agenda:
[T]he naturalization statute long required that a noncitizen be “attached
to constitutional principles,” a requirement that was invoked to bar
naturalization of lawful permanent residents who are conscientious
objectors to military service and Jehovah’s Witnesses who object to
voting, participating in politics, and serving on juries.
KEVIN R. JOHNSON & BERNARD TRUJILLO, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER:
¿SÍ SE PUEDE? 56 (2011). See also Price v. INS, 962 F.2d 836, 844 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming a
lower court decision that denied a man’s naturalization petition because he was previously
involved with the Communist party). The man appealed the decision arguing that his First
Amendment rights were violated, but the court held that all statutory requirements must be
met before attaining naturalization rights. Id. at 837.
36
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978. See generally My
Xuan T. Mai, Children Under the Radar: The Unique Plight of Special Immigrant Juveniles, 12
BARRY L. REV. 241, 244–45 (2009) (examining the INA 1990 SIJS requirements and evolution).
In addition to the court determinations, a child seeking SIJS “was required to submit a Form
I-360 along with an I-485 application for adjustment of status.” Id. at 245.
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court concluded that the juvenile required government protection, then
the court could declare the juvenile a dependent of the court.37
Additionally, SIJS 1990 gave the USCIS the exclusive right to make
decisions on naturalization applications. 38
Issues quickly arose with SIJS 1990 because there were no provisions
to ensure that a child granted SIJS could later receive legal permanent
resident status, and the bifurcation between the federal and state
government in the SIJS process was not thoroughly explained.39 Congress
addressed the first issue by removing the bars of admissibility, which
allowed minors to adjust their status to legal permanent residency. 40 To
address the intent of bifurcating the SIJS process between the state and
federal government, Congress expressly stated its intent for the state
juvenile court to determine the best interests of the child. 41 At this time,
the SIJS statutory language was vague, resulting in abuse by visiting
college students from other countries.42 As a result, the 1997 SIJS
37
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2012); Chen, supra note 9, at 608 (declaring that the
juvenile courts’ role is substantive in determining whether the factual underlinings support
a “special findings” court order to petition the USCIS for SIJS). Also, this juvenile court order
makes the child dependent on the juvenile court. Chen, supra note 9, at 608.
38
See RACHEL GONZALEZ SETTLAGE ET AL., IMMIGRATION RELIEF: LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR
NONCITIZEN CRIME VICTIMS 72 (2014) (discussing the role of the USCIS in determining the
child’s legal immigration status).
39
See Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub.
L. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733 (removing the adjustment requirement for SIJS grantees to meet
Section 245 of the Immigration Act of 1990); Special Immigrant Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 42844
(Aug. 12, 1993) (asserting that many SIJS grantees were denied lawful permanent residency
status because they were unable to meet the statutory requirements for immigrant visa’s or
adjustment status); Bifurcate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining bifurcate as
to separate into two parts, especially for convenience).
40
See Special Immigrant Status, 58 Fed. Reg. at 42844 (noting congressional intent to
alleviate many of the hardships associated with SIJS 1990). SIJS 1990 merely prevented
deportation for SIJS grantees, but did not allow the temporary status to transition into lawful
permanent residency. Id. “The technical amendments made clear that ‘for the purpose of
applying for adjustment of status as a special immigrant juvenile . . . these juveniles will be
treated as if they had been paroled into the United States.’” Lloyd, supra note 10, at 242–43
(quoting Special Immigrant Status, Certain Aliens Declared Dependent on a Juvenile Court,
58 Fed. Reg. 42843, 42849 (Aug. 12, 1993)).
41
Special Immigrant Status, 58 Fed. Reg. at 42847. The final statute granted juvenile
courts and state or local social agencies the power to determine the best interests of the child.
Id. Congress did not intend to put burdensome and impractical tasks on juvenile courts,
such as re-adjudicating the best interest determinations. Id. These tasks would only delay
relief for children in need of lawful permanent residency. Id.
42
See Yeboah v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3rd Cir. 2003) (reporting abuse of
the SIJS remedy by visiting college students); Mai, supra note 36, at 246 (investigating the
evolution of SIJS law); supra Part II.A (evaluating SIJS 1990 and its infancy). The leaders of
the visiting students’ native countries encouraged the U.S. Attorney General to investigate
the fraud in the SIJS applications from these students. Mai, supra note 36, at 246. For
example, “New Mexico Senator Pete Domenici stated that there ‘is a giant
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amendments limited the number of children eligible for SIJS and placed
procedural hurdles for the children currently enduring SIJS proceedings. 43
B. Immigration Act of 1997: Congress’ Response to the Abuse of Available
Remedies
The Immigration Act of 1997, Section 113 (“1997 SIJS Amendment”)
altered the course of SIJS applications.44 Some state courts and the USCIS
still rely on the restricting language of the 1997 amendments to deny SIJS
petitions form children who may qualify for SIJS under the new
amendments.45 The 1997 SIJS Amendment required the child petitioning
for SIJS to be eligible for long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect, or
abandonment, and the SIJS applicant had to receive the consent of the
Attorney General.46
The consent requirement can be further divided into two categories:
express consent and specific consent.47 Express consent is prevalent in
cases where the juvenile is not in the custody of the Attorney General and

loophole . . . [e]very visiting student from overseas can have a petition filed in a state
court . . . declaring that they’re a ward and in need of foster care.’” Id.
43
See, e.g., Gao v. Jenifer, 185 F.3d 548, 555 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Ingham County
probate court had jurisdiction to declare Gao dependent on the state of Michigan while in
INS legal custody). Gao was born in China and entered the United States illegally and
unaccompanied. Id. at 551. Because of the 1997 SIJS Amendment’s attempt to expressly state
the separation of federal and state roles in the SIJS process, children seeking SIJS had a higher
burden of proof. Id.
44
See supra Part III (debating current state court and USCIS reliance on legislative history).
45
See Anderson, supra note 11, at 673 (analyzing the impact of the 1997 administrative
hurdles). These procedural hurdles were implemented to target visiting college students
seeking SIJS to “circumvent immigration procedures.” Id. at 670.
46
Dep’ts of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat. 2440 (1997); see Yu v. Brown, 92 F.
Supp. 2d 1236, 1246 (D.N.M. 2000) (“The 1990 definition of Special Immigrant Juvenile
contained no requirements that the juvenile be abandoned, neglected or abused.”);
Anderson, supra note 11, at 671 (scrutinizing the added requirements of the SIJS 1997
amendments). The first of the new requirements placed a burden on all SIJS petitioners
“requir[ing] some children to navigate through the foster care system for up to eighteen
months.” Anderson, supra note 11, at 671. This provision also created the hotly contested
“aging out” problem, as many SIJS petitioners would “age-out” of the juvenile system before
obtaining SIJS approval. Id. The added requirement of consent caused many issues for SIJS
petitioners because immigration officials could deny a SIJS application without little or any
justification. Ooi, supra note 33, at 890. As one scholar notes, the consent requirement is a
“procedural hurdle” and “an arbitrary process with little basis in understandings of child
welfare.” Id.
47
See Carlos Lopez, In re Zaim R., 52 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 459, 460–61 (2008) (advocating
for a narrow construction of “constructive custody” to ensure consent for children in INS
custody).
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where the juvenile court issues a dependency order.48 Specific consent is
an issue “in cases where the juvenile is in the actual or constructive
custody of the attorney general.”49 In order for the SIJS application to be
approved, the applicant had to receive at least one form of express or
specific consent.50
Shortly after enacting the 1997 SIJS Amendment, Congress issued a
report clarifying its intent in amending the statute. 51 The congressional
report expressed disdain for the abuse of SIJS stating:
The language has been modified in order to limit the
beneficiaries of this provision to those juveniles for whom
it was created, namely abandoned, neglected, or abused
children, by requiring the Attorney General to determine
that neither the dependency order nor the administrative
or judicial determination of the alien’s best interest was
sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence,
rather than for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse
or neglect.52

48
See id. at 460 (describing the SIJS consent requirements). Express consent from the
attorney general was a part of INA 1990; however, the 1997 SIJS Amendment changes “made
the attorney general’s exclusive authority to grant SIJ status clearer.” Id. at 461.
49
Id. If the juvenile is in the actual or constructive custody of the attorney general, “state
court dependency orders are null and void unless the attorney general has specifically
consented to the jurisdiction of the state court prior to the issuance of the order.” Id. Before
the 1997 SIJS Amendment, state court dependency orders were valid without the Attorney
General’s specific consent. Id. The obstacle within this change was that juveniles who did
not obtain the “specific consent” of the attorney general were not allowed to prove abuse,
abandonment, or neglect before the juvenile state court, which is key to obtaining SIJS
approval. Lopez, supra note 47, at 461.
50
Dep’ts of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat. 2440 (1997); see Ooi, supra note 33,
at 890 (discussing the impact of the SIJS requirements).
51
See Lloyd, supra note 10, at 259 (evaluating the obstacles of 1997 SIJS Amendment). “The
memoranda thus called for the agency to make independent determinations of a juvenile
applicant's dependency status: this effectively required the agency ‘to routinely readjudicate
judicial or social service agency administrative determinations’ in contravention of the
agency's own stated preference for deferring to state agency decisions.” Id. (quoting 58 Fed.
Reg. 42847 (1993)).
52
See H.R. REP. NO. 105-405, at 130 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 CONGRESSIONAL REPORT]
(expressing the political concern for SIJS given the time period); Memorandum from the
USCIS on Recommendation 47, Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) Adjudications 4 (July 13,
2011),
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Ombudsman%20
Liaison/Responses%20to%20Formal%20Recommendations/cisomb-2011-response47.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7BXV-BXAL] (“The consent function is essentially a discretionary
determination that the petition is bona fide and that there is a reasonable basis for the agency’s
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The issue of ensuring a “bona fide” SIJS petition is not a formal requirement
for the SIJS statute, but instead a fear of granting SIJS too freely. 53 This
congressional report demonstrates an intent to limit the number of
children eligible for SIJS.54 Seven years later, William Yates, Associate
Director for Operations of the USCIS, relied on this congressional report
to support a narrow SIJS statute interpretation stating “express consent is
an acknowledgement that the request for SIJ classification is bona fide.”55
C. Modern Statutory Amendments to SIJS: The William Wilberforce
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
In 2000, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act began as a human
trafficking legislative initiative to help child victims.56 SIJS became a
temporary residency status for child sex victims because the victims were
required to receive adjustment of status for legal permanent residency. 57
consent to the SIJ classification”). A juvenile court order stating the basis of “special
findings” due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment is allegedly sufficient enough to warrant
consent from the Attorney General. Memorandum from the USCIS on Recommendation 47.
53
See Lloyd, supra note 10, at 244 (reporting that Senator Pete Domenici of Arizona
proposed heightening the SIJS requirements due to the belief that older Mexican teenagers
were applying for the remedy simply to attend college in the United States); Memorandum
from Safe Passage Project for the House Judiciary Committee (Mar. 2, 2015) (on file with the
author) (observing that SIJS is one of the most underutilized immigration remedies with
under 4000 petitions filed in 2013); infra Part II.D (describing Nebraska’s current
interpretation of SIJS with reliance on the 1997 Congressional Report).
54
See also Sally Terry Green, Protection for Victims of Child Sex Trafficking in the United States:
Forging the Gap Between U.S. Immigration Laws and Human Trafficking Laws, 12 U.C. DAVIS J.
JUV. L. & POL’Y 309, 342–44 (2008) (expounding that the SIJS 1997 amendments created
controversies instead of remedies).
55
Memorandum from William Yates, Assoc. Dir. for Ops., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
U.S. Citizenship & Imm. Servs., at 2 (May 27, 2004), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/
files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/Archives%201998-2008/2004/
sij_memo_052704.pdf [http://perma.cc/R76X-U6BH] [hereinafter Yates].
See also
Memorandum from Donald Neufeld from the USCIS, Acting Assoc. Dir. For Dom. Ops., U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship & Imm. Servs., at 3 (Mar. 24, 2009),
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memo
randa/2009/TVPRA_SIJ.pdf [http://perma.cc/7CP9-A8J9] (restating the 1997 logic despite
the TVPRA 2008 Amendment). Of particular importance is the bona fide claim reliance that
says “[t]his means that the SIJ benefit was not ‘sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining
the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, rather than for the purpose
of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect or abandonment.’” Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105405, at 130 (1997)).
56
See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), Pub. L. No. 106386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified in 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2012)) (purporting to protect child victims of
human trafficking); Green, supra note 54, at 313 (explaining that “congressional sponsors
coined the ‘three Ps’—prosecution, prevention and protection—as representative of the
legislature’s intent.”).
57
See Green, supra note 54, at 344 (articulating that the purpose of the SIJS statute was to
allow children to adjust their status to lawful permanent residency).
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In December 2008, the TVPRA 2008 was passed and signed into law.58 The
TVPRA 2008 requires mandatory screening for children caught by border
patrol to determine if the child is a victim of trafficking or any other
serious crime that puts the child’s life in danger. 59 Prior to the enactment
of TVPRA 2008, Immigration and Customs Officers gave consent for state
juvenile courts to exercise jurisdiction over the child’s dependency
determination.60 The amendment designated the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services to consent to the exercise of state
jurisdiction.61 TVPRA 2008 addressed many shortcomings of SIJS, such as
the “aging-out” issue by “mandate[ing] the expeditious adjudication of
Special Immigrant Juvenile applications, requiring that the Secretary of
Homeland Security process these applications within 180 days after the
application is filed.” 62 Further, the amendment removed the SIJS filing
fee, and as a result, increased the number of applicants applying for SIJS.63
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
(TVPRA), Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044. The primary purpose of TVPRA is “to bolster
federal efforts to combat trafficking and, in the process, to provide critical protections for the
tens of thousands of unaccompanied minors who come to the United States each year.”
JUNCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 1-14. “The law seeks to create better screening of
unaccompanied minors who may be the victims of trafficking and other vulnerable children,
safer repatriation of any youth removed from the United States, more compassionate
environments for children in immigration custody, and broader legal protections and access
to services for these youth.” Id.
59
See JUNCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 1-14 (describing the screening process that
undocumented children endure to determine if they are a victim of human trafficking or fear
persecution). If the child becomes older than twenty-one during the adjudication
proceedings, the child is still eligible for SIJS approval. Id. at 3-8. “The TVPRA also provides
that children be placed in the least restrictive setting that is in ‘the best interest of the child’
and prohibits children from being placed in secure facilities[.]” Id. at 1-14. An exception to
the detention provision is “unless a determination has been made that the child poses a
danger to him or herself or others or has been charged with having committed a criminal
offense.” Id. The TVPRA 2008 further provides that Health and Human Services “review
such placement on a monthly basis.” Id.
60
Ooi, supra note 33, at 890; see also Deborah Lee et al., Practice Advisory, Update on Legal
Relief Options for Unaccompanied Alien Children Following the Enactment of the William
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, at 5,
http://www.ilrc.org/files/235_tvpra_practice_advisory.infonet.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
S57H-VTJ3] (specifying that TVPRA transferred specific consent of children in Immigration
and Customs Enforcement authority to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
61
See Lee et al., supra note 60, at 5 (reciting that TVPRA transferred the authority of specific
consent, but did not explain how the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services should
act upon that consent).
62
Id. at 6. The progress with “aging-out” is due to the “Child Status Protection Act,”
which protects applicants from losing immigration benefits because they have reached the
age of twenty-one. Pub. L. No. 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (2002).
63
See Ooi, supra note 33, at 890–91 (explaining the impact of the TVPRA 2008 SIJS
amendment).
Legal scholars have long advocated for legal representation for
unaccompanied children facing the juvenile and immigration courts. David B. Thronson,
58
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Currently, a SIJS petition has seven requirements: (1) dependency,
delinquency, or other juvenile court proceedings;64 (2) the juvenile court
must find that reunification with one or both parents is not viable;65 (3)
due to abuse, neglect, abandonment or similar basis under State Law;66 (4)
the court or an administrative agency must determine that it is not in the
child’s best interest to be returned to his or her home country; 67 (5) the
juvenile court judge should sign an order making the above finding;68 (6)
consent to the grant of SIJS and specific consent;69 and (7) age and
Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Children's Rights Underlying Immigration Law,
63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 980 (2002) (addressing the rights of children in the immigration process
while suggesting a child-centered approach). David Thronson advocated for a childcentered approach, as well as removing the INS power to determine immigration applicant’s
fate. Id. at 1012–13. This position is supported by “the conflict in having a single agency that
adjudicates claims for immigration benefits while protecting the borders and prosecuting
violations of immigration laws.” Id. at 1013.
64
JUNCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 3-4. This includes the courts placement of the child to an
agency, department, individual, or entity appointed by a state or juvenile court. Id.
65
See Lee et al., supra note 60, at 3–4 (discussing TVPRA 2008’s change to the language of
the SIJS, which is the most controversial provision of the statute). The language of the second
requirement replaced the old requirement that the child must be “‘deemed eligible for longterm foster care’ by the court, which in turn was interpreted to mean that family reunification
was no longer a viable option.” JUNCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 3-5. Currently, the child does
not have to prove he or she will never be able to reunite with the parent, but “as long as there
is a significant separation” the court should find this requirement met. Id. at 3-4. Though
some states argue that the “one or both” language is ambiguous, the current statute does not
require a child to be separated from both parents to meet this requirement. Id. Instead “the
statute appears to provide SIJS eligibility on the basis of the non-viability of reunification
with one parent due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment, even while the child remains in the
care of the other parent or while the court is actively trying to reunite the child with the other
parent.” Id. This portion of the requirements demonstrate the conflict with having a statute
that requires state and federal intervention. Id.
66
JUNCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 3-6. There does not have to be formal charges of abuse,
neglect, or abandonment against the parents and the abuse does not have to occur within the
United States. Id. See Chen, supra note 9, at 604 (expressing congressional intent in protecting
vulnerable immigrant children). “In many SIJ cases, adults bring children into the country
and continue to control and abuse them. Often parents have complete control over their
child’s immigration status . . . and may threaten the minor with deportation to prevent the
minor from resisting and reporting the abuse.” Id. See also Randi Mandelbaum & Elissa
Steglich, Disparate Outcomes: The Quest for Uniform Treatment of Immigrant Children, 50 FAM.
CT. REV. 606, 606 (2012) (explaining how immigrant children frequently interact with the
family court system, especially in SIJS determinations).
67
JUNCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 3-6. The judge should include language “that it is not in
the child’s best interest to be returned to his or her country of nationality” in the SIJS order,
which can be evidenced by an interview with the child seeking SIJS. Id. at 3-6–3-7.
68
See id. at 3-7 (reflecting the language of the revised SIJS statute, “the SIJS order will likely
be rejected and a revised one will have to be obtained”).
69
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(iii) (2012) (stating the actual consent requirement
implemented by Congress, which is construed to deny eligible SIJS applicants); Yates, supra
note 55, at 2 (declaring that “express consent is an acknowledgement that the request for SIJ
classification is bona fide”); JUNCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 3-7 (expounding that the sixth
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marriage requirements.70 The only applicants eligible for SIJS are children
who meet the family court requirements and receive the consent of the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).71
Since the enactment of TVPRA 2008, there have been unsuccessful
attempts to amend the current SIJS law.72 In 2011, Congress proposed to
extend dependency, commitment, or custody through the time of
adjudication, to address the issue of applicants aging out of juvenile court
dependence.73 The 2011 proposals expressed support for the current age,
marriage, and juvenile court special findings determinations; however,
they gave little to no guidance on clarifying the viability of reunification
with one or both parents due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment.74
requirement is a two-part threshold: “(1) consent to the grant of SIJS in any case [by the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)]; and (2) specific consent for a
juvenile court determination on a child’s custody or placement status if the child is in federal
custody during removal (deportation) proceedings”). The Secretary of DHS gives consent
by approving SIJS applications; “[t]his consent is an acknowledgement that SIJS was not
‘sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, rather than for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect or
abandonment.’” JUNCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 3-7 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-405, at 130
(1997)). The second threshold only applies to the children who seek a juvenile court
determination while in juvenile custody. Id. In sum, the second portion of consent is only
relevant in the sense of that TVPRA 2008 amendment that the Department of Homeland
Security was required to give specific consent to the SIJS petition. Id.
70
JUNCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 3-8. The applicant must be under age twenty-one at time
of filing with CIS, and must remain unmarried until the entire immigration process is
completed. Id. Before the TVPRA 2008 amendments, this required applicants to complete
the entire immigration adjudication process before turning twenty-one, but the amendment
allows a person to be eligible as long as they are twenty-one or under when filing the SIJS
petition with the USCIS. Id. Though the USCIS permits the child to be twenty-one when
filing, “[s]tate laws generally require that a child be under age eighteen at the time he or she
first is declared a juvenile court dependent.” Id. Another issue for a child in the SIJS process
is that dependency, delinquency, or other juvenile court jurisdiction ends when a child turns
eighteen years of age, but one of the requirements for SIJS is that the petitioner have an active
case with the juvenile court. Id. Since TVPRA provides “age-out” protection, the USCIS
should not be able to deny anyone on the account of age. Id. at 3-9.
71
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (enumerating the statutory requirements for SIJS
applicants).
72
See Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 54978 (proposed Sept. 6, 2011)
(addressing the unadopted 2011 SIJS amendments); Sarah Bronstein, USCIS Issues Proposed
Regulations Pertaining to Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, CLINIC LEGAL,
https://cliniclegal.org/september2011newsletter/SIJS [https://perma.cc/GCW6-LURM]
(explaining the potential impact of these amendments).
73
See Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 54978 (proposed Sept. 6, 2011)
(implementing changes to the SIJS portion of the INA).
74
See Bronstein, supra note 72 (explaining the impact that the 2011 proposals could have
on the SIJS process if adopted). The suggested 2011 amendment proposed the following: (1)
to no longer provide for automatic revocation of the application for a petitioner who turns
twenty-one; (2) clarified that adoption and guardianship proceedings fall under the meaning
of the statute where a state could make a “special findings” determination; (3) juvenile courts
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In November 2014, President Obama advocated for additional
funding to support legalizing citizenship for millions of undocumented
adults and children currently living in America.75 In response, U.S. House
Representatives have proposed acts that would prevent congressional
funding of President Obama’s immigration plan. 76 First, Representative
Martha Roby released a Prevention of Executive Amnesty Act of 2015 that
advocated against funding President Obama’s immigration plan. 77 Then,
Representative Robert Aderholt of Alabama filed the “Repeal Executive
Amnesty Act of 2015,” which contains a provision to strike “[one] or both
of the immigrant’s parents” language of the current SIJS statute and
replace it with “either of the immigrant’s parents.” 78 The U.S. House of

maintain jurisdiction throughout the entire SIJS process; (4) the abuse, neglect, and
abandonment analysis rests solely on the state court; (5) consent of a juvenile court order is
not required; (6) clarified that the 180-day period to adjudicate I-360 petitions begin when a
receipt notice from the USCIS is issued; and (7) some inadmissibility and adjustment of status
changes. Id. The 2011 proposal failed to make any further comment on the TVPRA 2008
change from the “long-term foster care” to “one or both” parent language, which continues
to divide the state courts. Id.
75
See Alicia Parlapiano, What Is President Obama’s Immigration Plan?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/20/us/2014-11-20-immigration.
html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/5S66-T4WN] (describing President Obama’s current
immigration plan that will allow undocumented immigrants that were present in the United
States for five years or more to potentially receive lawful permanent residency).
76
See Warren Mass, House Passes “Executive Amnesty Prevention Act of 2014”, U.S. NEWS
(Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/immigration/item/19667house-passes-executive-amnesty-prevention-act-of-2014 [http://perma.cc/QM92-CEVV]
(recounting that the House passed the Amnesty Prevention Act to prevent President
Obama’s immigration plan from moving forward); Byron York, The Two GOP Plans to Stop
Obama’s Immigration Action, WASH. EXAM’R (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.washington
examiner.com/the-two-gop-plans-to-stop-obamas-immigration-action/article/2558347
[http://perma.cc/3ZHB-ZLZU] (discussing the Alabama Senators’ proposals for
immigration reform).
77
Press Release, Martha Roby, Roby Bill Seeks to Block Executive Amnesty (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://roby.house.gov/press-release/roby-bill-seeks-block-executive-amnesty
[http://perma.cc/9TMK-GQMF] [hereinafter Press Release, Roby] (arguing that President
Obama’s plan was irresponsible).
78
S. 114th Cong. § 302 (proposed Jan. 8, 2015). The proposed statute reads as follows:
“Section 101(a)(27)(J)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1011(a)(27)(J)(i)) is
amended by striking ‘[one] or both of the immigrant’s parents’ and inserting ‘either of the
immigrant’s parents.’” Id. Additionally, Rep. Aderholt proposes to change the definition of
unaccompanied alien. Id. § 304. The proposal suggests the following definition:
Section 462(g)(2) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
279(g)(2)) is amended to read as follows:
(2) The term “unaccompanied alien child”—
(A) means an alien who—
(i) has no lawful immigration status in the United States;
(ii) has not attained 18 years of age; and
(iii) with respect to whom—
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Representatives voted in favor of defunding President Obama’s
immigration plans; however, advocates are still fighting for
undocumented children’s rights.79 If these proposals are adopted, many
valid SIJS petitions will be denied.80
D. SIJS Divided: The Role of the State and Federal Government in SIJS
Determinations
Currently in state judicial proceedings, courts disagree on TVPRA
2008’s impact on SIJS.81 The courts disagree specifically on the role of the
state and federal government in determining SIJS eligibility, and the intent
of Congress in removing “long-term foster care” and replacing it with
(I)

there is no parent or legal guardian in the United
States;
(II) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is
available to provide care and physical custody; or
(III) no sibling over 18 years of age, aunt, uncle,
grandparent, or cousin over 18 years of age is
available to provide care and physical custody;
except that
(B) such term shall cease to include an alien if at any time a
parent, legal guardian, sibling over 18 years of age, aunt, uncle,
grandparent, or cousin over 18 years of age of the alien is found in
the United States and is available to provide care and physical
custody (and the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary
of Health and Human Services shall revoke accordingly any prior
designation of the alien under this paragraph).
Id. If this statute was adopted, children who may not have any contact with family members
in the United States could be excluded from the definition of an unaccompanied alien. Id.
79
See Rebecca Shabad & Cristina Marcos, House Passes Bill to Defund Obama’s Immigration
Orders, THE HILL (Jan. 14, 2015, 12:06 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/
house/229469-house-votes-to-defund-obamas-immigration-orders
[http://perma.cc/
ZQU2-F38R] (asserting that the House passed a bill to defund Obama’s immigration plan);
Memorandum from Fordham Law School for the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary
Committee (Mar. 2, 2015) (on file with the author) (urging Congress not to adopt H.R. 1153
because it is contrary to the child’s best interests); Fordham Univ. School of Law et al., Special
Provisions for Immigrant Youth: A Model State Statute 4 (Feb. 2015), http://law.fordham.
edu/assets/FeerickCenter/UIC_Report__--__February_2015.docx_(PDF_Final_Report)_
uploaded_2-18-2015(1).pdf [http://perma.cc/TAE5-S9H6] (proposing a Model State Statute
to assist states in determining the best interests of undocumented children).
80
See infra Part III.C (discussing the impact of denying children SIJS on account of having
one parent present in the United States).
81
See infra Part III.C (analyzing the differing interpretations of state courts and the USCIS
of TVPRA 2008). Compare In re J.C., CO68667, 2015 WL 513399, at *17 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 6,
2015) (denying a seventeen year old’s request for special findings because the child’s mother
was present and not because of the child’s juvenile delinquency), with In re Karen C., 111
A.D.3d 622, 623 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (affirming a Family Court’s decision granting “special
findings” for SIJS based on detailed affidavits from the child and the child’s mother
describing the father’s abandonment).
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“reunification with [one] or both parents.” 82 Part II.D.1 observes the
federal government’s role in the SIJS process. 83 Part II.D.2 explains the
state’s role in the SIJS process and the differing interpretations of who
qualifies for SIJS, paying special attention to New York’s and Nebraska’s
Supreme Court decisions.84
1.

Federal Government: Apprehension, Detainment, and Consent

The federal government’s involvement in SIJS starts at the border if
the child is captured by border patrol.85 Once captured by an agency, the
child will be held in the custody of that specific agency, which could be
DHS, USCIS, Department of Health and Human Services, or the Office of
Refugee Resettlement.86 If the child has a family member whom they
could be released into the custody of, the agency will release the child. 87
If the child does not have a family member to take custody, the child can
See Laura E. Ploeg, Special Immigrant Juveniles: All the Special Rules, 8 IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR
1, 4 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ILA-Newsleter/ILA%202014/vol8no1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/45YX-GC2Z] (“Prior to the TVPRA amendments, SIJ classification
required a State court finding that the child was eligible for long-term foster care, which
effectively meant that reunification was not viable with either parent.”); supra Part II.B–C
(weighing the amendments to SIJS statutory language). The U.S. Department of Justice states
that “the alien child could potentially be living with one parent and still qualify for SIJ
status.” Ploeg, supra note 82, at 4.
83
See infra Part II.D.1 (examining the federal government’s role in SIJS for children in
federal custody at the time of judicial proceedings and consent upon juvenile court orders).
84
See infra Part II.D.2 (introducing the differing opinions of the New York Supreme Court
and the Nebraska Supreme Court regarding the statutory interpretation of SIJS).
85
See Timothy E. Yahner, Splitting the Baby: Immigration, Family Law, and the Problem of the
Single Deportable Parent, 45 AKRON L. REV. 769, 782 (2012) (explaining that an alien in custody
of Border Patrol may apply for relief from deportation, but the alien must prove eligibility
for one of the forms of relief).
86
See Anderson, supra note 11, at 675 (revealing the agencies involved in capturing and
placing undocumented children).
“Because USCIS is charged with the primary
responsibility of deporting illegal immigrants, some have questioned whether USCIS is the
best organization to make final determinations on SIJ status, as granting a petition
contradicts its primary purpose.” Id. at 675–76. See also Catherine E. Halliday, Inheriting the
Storied Pomp of Ancient Lands: An Analysis of the Application of Federal Immigration Law on the
United States’ Northern and Southern Borders, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 181, 207 (2001) (discussing the
United States’ selective border patrol policies, which demonstrates a specific prejudice to the
Mexican border). “The Mexican border receives one border patrol agent for every half of a
mile, whereas the Canadian border receives one border patrol agent for every thirteen
miles.” Id.
87
See Olga Byrne & Elise Miller, The Flow of Unaccompanied Children Through the
Immigration System: A Resource for Practitioners, Policy Makers, and Researchers, VERA INST. OF
JUST. 10 (2012) (explaining that a child can be apprehended by the Customs and Border
Patrol, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security, or Immigration and Customs
Enforcement). “Other unaccompanied children are first arrested by a state or local law
enforcement agency, and when these ‘internal apprehensions’ occur, an immigration arrest
may take place at various points during the juvenile or criminal justice process.” Id.
82
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petition a juvenile court for special findings required for SIJS while in the
custody of the agency.88
Once an applicant receives the required special findings from the
juvenile court, the applicant may petition the USCIS for SIJS.89 The child
must complete the SIJS petition (Form I-360) and an Application to
Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485).90 Then, the
child is either granted SIJS or denied through the “consent” of the
Secretary of DHS.91
Children seeking SIJS approval remain vulnerable to the possibility of
having their petition denied by the Field Office Director despite meeting
statutory requirements.92 Currently, the federal statute regulating SIJS
provides states with unilateral discretion to determine eligibility. 93
88
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012) (stating that a child in the custody of USCIS can
petition a juvenile court for SIJS).
89
See Heryka Knoespel, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: A “Juvenile” Here Is not a
“Juvenile” There, 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 505, 515 (2013) (describing the
complex dual relationship between the state and federal government for SIJS).
90
See
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SIJ PETITION PROCESS
(2011),
http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/special-immigrant-juveniles/sij-petition-process
[http://perma.cc/T788-4BHM] (requiring applicants to file a Form I-360 Petition for
Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant and a Form I-485 Application to Register
Permanent Residence or Adjust Status). The forms can be filed separately, but it is more
efficient if the applicant files the forms together. Id.
91
See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Petition for Special Immigrant Juvenile
Pursuant to Section to 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4), at 4
(June 4, 2009), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/err/C6%20-%20Dependent%20of
%20Juvenile%20Court/Decisions_Issued_in_2009/Jun042009_01C6101.pdf [http://perma.
cc/RTZ8-3J29] (modifying the definition of the two forms of consent—express and specific
consent). The Field Officer Director (“FOD”) denied an eighteen year old child from El
Salvador’s request because he felt that the petitioner failed to show that the juvenile court
order was sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse, neglect, or
abandonment. Id. at 5. The FOD ruled the evidence suggested the child came to the United
States to be reunited with her parents. Id. However, on April 17, 2009, just two months
before the El Salvador decision, the Administrative Appeals Office (“AAO”) granted a child’s
SIJS petition stating that “it is not a matter of discretion but of eligibility.” U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services, Petition for Special Immigrant Juvenile Pursuant to Section to 203(b)(4)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4), at 4 (Apr. 17, 2009),
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/err/C6%20-%20Dependent%20of%20Juvenile
%20Court/Decisions_Issued_in_2009/Apr172009_01C6101.pdf [http://perma.cc/4A4QWAC6] (quoting Matter of Polidoro, 12 I & N Dec. 353, 354 (BIA 1967)) (reviewing an
eighteen year old citizen of Guatemala’s SIJS petition).
92
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii) (2012) (pronouncing that the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security must consent to the grant of SIJS to be valid).
93
See Knoespel, supra note 89, at 515 (examining the federal government’s role in SIJS).
The issue with the federal government’s discretion in granting SIJS is due to the conflict in
roles. Id. One scholar states:
The INS’s primary mission and functions are to enforce immigration
law, monitor United States borders and ports of entry, and remove
individuals who do not have lawful immigration status. The role of the
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Further, the USCIS denies many SIJS petitions for failure to state a bona
fide petition.94
2.

State Government: The Best Interests of the Child

The juvenile court is responsible for determining if “special findings”
exist that enable the applicant to petition the USCIS for SIJS.95 In
determining special findings, the juvenile court ensures the following
procedural hurdles are satisfied: the child is unmarried, under the age of
twenty-one, and dependent on the juvenile court. 96 In addition, the
juvenile court is required to make a substantive evaluation to determine if
the child is unable to be reunited with “one or both parents due to abuse,
abandonment, or neglect” and whether it is in the child’s best interest to
return to his or her country of citizenship.97 Different states come to
different results, leaving inconsistencies for immigrant children seeking
SIJS.98 New York takes a plain meaning approach to the SIJS statute,
whereas Nebraska takes a narrow, more restricting approach.99 These two
approaches result in outcome disparities for similarly situated children,
dependent upon which state the child seeks a juvenile court order to
petition the USCIS.100
The New York Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision that
denied a young girl and her little brother “special findings” to petition the

INS is that of a gatekeeper, not a disinterested party concerned with
assessing the needs of children. These functions place the agency in an
adversarial relationship with respect to all child applicants for SIJ status.
The INS cannot serve as both an adversary and a neutral adjudicator of
a child’s “best interest.”
Chen, supra note 9, at 612. The conflicting objectives of the INS do not serve the best interests
of the child. Id.
94
See Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, supra note 55, at 3 (discussing the USCIS’
discretion in granting consent if the applicant fails to prove that the claim is sought for relief
from abuse, abandonment, or neglect, as opposed to trying to circumvent the immigration
process and receive lawful permanent residency).
95
See Knoespel, supra note 89, at 512 (concluding that a juvenile court must find facts
based on state law to determine an applicant’s ability to petition the USCIS for SIJS).
96
See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c) (2014) (declaring that in order for an applicant to be granted SIJS,
the applicant must meet all of the Section 204.11(c) statutory requirements).
97
See supra Part II.C (describing the current SIJS requirements).
98
Compare Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S., 112 A.D.3d 100, 115 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)
(interpreting the SIJS statute broadly to grant petitioner SIJS), with In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d
639, 648 (Neb. 2012) (interpreting the SIJS statute narrowly to deny petitioner SIJS).
99
See infra Part II.D.2 (explaining the position of Nebraska and New York on TVPRA
2008’s impact on SIJS).
100
See infra Part III.C (analyzing the impact that the differing statutory interpretations have
on similarly situated children).
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USCIS for SIJS.101 Prior to being in the United States, the children’s mother
left them at a young age in Honduras to come and work in the United
States.102 Years later, the children made the same journey to be with their
mother, because of the abuse they suffered from their caretaker.103 After
getting caught at the United States-Mexico border, they were placed in a
Texas foster home and then allowed to stay in the United States with an
uncle in New York.104
The family petitioned a New York Family Court for SIJS eligibility,
but their applications were denied because reunification with one parent
was viable, thus making them ineligible for SIJS.105 The family appealed
to the New York Supreme Court, who reversed and determined that the
“[one] or both” language has a plain meaning understanding.106
Additionally, the court found that the elimination of the “long-term foster
care” requirement with the replacement of the “[one] or both” language
demonstrated an intent by the legislature to remove the requirement that
both parents had to be absent and allowed the children to receive SIJS if
abandoned, abused, or neglected by at least one parent. 107
A scenario with similar facts unfolded differently in Nebraska. 108
While in a juvenile treatment center, a teenage boy petitioned the family

101
See Marcelina M.-G., 112 A.D.3d at 115 (ruling that the children met the SIJS statutory
requirements because they are unmarried, under twenty-one years of age, reunification with
one or both parent was not viable due to abuse, neglect, and abandonment); MERRIL SOBIE &
GARY SOLOMON, 10 N. Y. FAM. CT. PRAC. § 2:113 (2d ed. 2014) (stating that the statute only
requires a showing that reunification with one parent would not be feasible and it would not
be in the best interest of the child to return to his or her home country).
102
Marcelina, 112 A.D.3d at 102. Susy and Jason were left with their aunt Estella, who had
children of her own, leaving them with little to no familial support. Id. The children were
miserable living with their Aunt Estella, who physically and mentally abused Susy and
Jason. Id.
103
Id. at 103. The mother arranged for the children to receive financial support from her
boyfriend, and then they set out on their long journey to the United States. Id.
104
Id. The children were detained for approximately eighty days before being released
into the custody of their uncle. Marcelina M-G., 112 A.D.3d at 103.
105
Id. at 106. The Family Court granted the mother’s petition to be the sole legal guardian
for the children, and denied the special findings because the children did not need both
parents. Id.
106
Id. The court interpreted the statute to mean that when reunification with just one
parent is not viable, the child is eligible for SIJS even if reunification with the other parent is
viable. Id. at 111.
107
Id. at 111–12; see Karen Moulding, Eligibility for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Under 8
U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J) and 8 C.F.R. § 204.11, 67 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 299 § 9 (2012) (weighing the
outcome in immigration cases where the child was in custody of one parent and applied for
special findings from a juvenile court for SIJS eligibility).
108
See In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Neb. 2012) (explaining the circumstances that
led to Erick’s SIJS application in greater detail).
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court for SIJS eligibility. 109 The boy automatically met the first
requirement because he was dependent on a juvenile court; however, the
family court found that he failed to show that reunification with his
mother was not viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment.110
The young boy appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that INA
Section 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) required that he show only that reunification with
one parent is not feasible because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. 111
The court found his argument reasonable; however, it favored the state’s
alternative interpretation that the phrase “[one] or both” means that
juvenile courts have discretion in ruling that either reunification with one
parent is not feasible or reunification with both parents is not feasible. 112
The Nebraska Supreme Court relied on the 1997 SIJS Amendment by
stating that “Congress intended that the amendment would prevent
youths from using this remedy for the purpose of obtaining legal
permanent resident status, rather than for the purpose of obtaining relief
from abuse or neglect.”113 While the court found that the boy’s father did

109
Id. at 641. In December 2010, a juvenile court committed Erick to the Office of Juvenile
Services for possession of alcohol. Id. at 642. In July 2011, Erick was transferred to a Youth
Rehabilitation and Treatment Center, where he continually disappeared, used alcohol and
drugs, violated the law, and threatened staff. Id. Erick explained to the staff that his erratic
behavior was because he wanted to go home for rehabilitation. Id. In September 2011, the
juvenile court began a hearing for Erick’s SIJS motion for eligibility. Id.
110
Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 642. To support a court finding of abandonment, Erick’s family
permanency specialist presented evidence that he did not have any contact information for
his father. Id. Erick’s family permanency specialist further testified that she was unsure if
paternity had been established, and that his father could be in either Mexico or New York.
Id. She also stated that she would continue to work with Erick’s mother regarding his
behavior upon his release from the rehabilitation center. Id. at 642–43.
111
Id. at 643. Particularly, Erick focused on the “[one] or both” language in the statute
arguing that Congress intended the statute to allow SIJS if the court found abuse,
abandonment, or neglect by one parent. Id. See also CHRISTINE P. COSTANTAKOS, 4 NEB. JUV.
CT. LAW & PRAC. § 12:14 (2014) (interpreting the Erick M. decision to hold that because the
juvenile could not prove that reunification was not viable with both parents, he did not meet
the reunification requirement of the SIJS statute).
112
See Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 54980 (proposed Sept. 6, 2011)
(suggesting possible amendments to the SIJS statute). The Nebraska Supreme Court began
its analysis by stating that where there is ambiguity in a statute, courts are allowed to
examine the act’s legislative history. Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 644. Further, the court
acknowledged that the 2011 proposals were not adopted and that the proposals did not
address the ambiguity in the language of the statute. Id. The court agreed that TVPRA 2008
expanded the pool of undocumented children who could apply for SIJS, but states that the
juvenile “must still be seeking relief from parental abuse, neglect, or abandonment.” Id. at
645.
113
Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 645. “USCIS will not consent to a petition for SIJ status if it was
‘sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, rather than for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect or
abandonment.’” Id. at 646.
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abandon him, the court held that he must also show that reunification
with the other parent is not feasible.114 Ultimately, the court held that the
boy’s petition was not bona fide.115 The Nebraska Supreme Court stated
that this boy was not abandoned because his father was never present in
his life and his mother was still in his life; yet three years prior, in David
C., the same court decided that a boy whose father left during the mother’s
pregnancy had abandoned him. 116 As a result of two different
interpretations by New York and Nebraska, two very similar set of facts

114
Id. at 647. However, the court took a narrow approach to interpreting the statute. Id.
The court used its discretion to focus on the feasibility of reunification with only one parent.
Id. Further, the court determined there was no need to consider whether reunification with
the father was feasible because Erick could return to a safe parent, his mother. Id. The court
presented a new rule that states “[i]f a juvenile alien’s absent parent has abused, neglected,
or abandoned the juvenile, a petitioner seeking SIJ status for the juvenile should offer
evidence on this issue.” Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 648. The court determined that Erick’s case
presented an exception to the rule because he lived with his mother during the juvenile court
proceedings. Id. The court found that the effects of abandonment from an absent parent
were irrelevant for SIJS. Id. at 647. The court also determined that there was no need to
analyze Erick’s father’s abandonment since reunification with Erick’s mother was feasible.
Id. at 648. The Nebraska Supreme Court minimized the emotional turmoil that Erick suffered
from his father’s abandonment because Erick did not claim that reunification with his mother
was not feasible. Id. at 647.
115
Id. at 648.
116
Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 642. See Adoption of David C., 790 N.W.2d 205, 211 (Neb. 2010)
(affirming the trial court’s finding of abandonment by the child’s father). The child, David,
resided with his mother since birth. Id. at 208. A few years later, David’s mother married a
man, who is not David’s biological father, and petitioned the court for a step-parent
adoption. Id. at 207. David’s mother alleged that David’s father abandoned him. Id. at 208.
The Nebraska Supreme Court agreed and ruled in favor of the petitioner. Id. at 212. This
case was not about SIJS or immigration, but another case in which the court was asked to
determine the best interests of the child. Id. The court defined willful abandonment as:
[A] voluntary and intentional relinquishment of the custody of the child
to another, with the intent to never again claim the rights of a parent or
perform the duty of a parent; or, second, an intentional withholding
from the child, without just cause or excuse, by the parent, of his
presence, his care, his love and his protection, maintenance, and the
opportunity for the display of filial affection[.]
David C., 790 N.W.2d at 211. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court by finding
that the “record supports by clear and convincing evidence that [the father] abandoned [the
child],” because the father had no contact with the son, did not offer any parental or financial
support, and did not attempt to visit the child. Id. Additionally, the court found the child to
be abandoned by his father because the father “voluntarily discontinu[ed] any contact with
[the child].” Id. at 211. Under the same analysis that the court used in David C., Erick’s father
willfully abandoned him. Id. at 211; Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 643. Erick’s father intentionally
withheld “his presence, his care, his love and his protection, maintenance, and the
opportunity for the display of filial affection[.]” David C., 790 N.W.2d at 211; Erick M., 820
N.W.2d at 643. Erick’s father did not attempt to make any contact with him, nor did he
provide for Erick financially, emotionally, or any other actions attributed to fathers. Erick
M., 820 N.W.2d at 647.
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can have two very different outcomes.117 Therefore, because of the
outcome disparities, a solution is needed to find one uniform and feasible
option for the courts to apply.118
III. ANALYSIS
The varying and narrow interpretations of current SIJS law must be
addressed given the realities of the increasing number of undocumented
children in the United States.119 Despite TVPRA 2008’s amendment to the
SIJS statute, courts continue to embrace the limiting and restricting
standard derived from the 1997 Congressional Report.120 Although
TVPRA 2008 deliberately removed the requirement that the applicant be
eligible for long-term foster care, courts have been slow to fully accept the
added “[one] or both” language.121
Consequently, courts apply varying standards to SIJS statutory
interpretation; and thus, the law has failed to promote uniformity in SIJS
juvenile proceeding outcomes. 122 The issues prior to TVPRA 2008 are
ongoing, despite congressional indication to depart from the prior
standard, which is evidenced by replacing the existing long term foster
care language with “[one] or both.”123 Primarily, inconsistent applications
117
See Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S., 112 A.D.3d 100, 115 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (explaining
the SIJS statutory interpretation of New York’s court); Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 648 (discussing
Nebraska’s narrow interpretation of SIJS).
118
See infra Part IV.A (proposing to amend the current SIJS statute).
119
See supra note 5 and accompanying text (recognizing the increasing number of
undocumented children in the United States).
120
See supra note 113 and accompanying text (noting the Nebraska Supreme Court’s
reliance on a 1997 Congressional Report).
121
See, e.g., In re J.E., 74 A.3d 1013, 1023 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2013) (granting two
brothers SIJS special findings even though they could be safely placed within the custody of
their mother). The court reasoned that the children could be in danger if returned to their
native country and out of the custody of their only safe parent. Id. at 1022. However, the
decision was overruled a year later. H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 269 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2014). In a similar case, the court reasoned that the child’s mother had not abused, neglected,
or abandoned him, and therefore the petitioner failed to show that reunification with his
mother was not viable. Id. The court relied on Erick M. as persuasive authority to deny
special findings needed from the juvenile court. Id. The court stated that “the express
objective of the petition was for M.S. to obtain relief for purposes of his immigration status,
rather than for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse, neglect, or abandonment[.]” Id.
122
See supra Part II.D.2 (comparing the New York and Nebraska Supreme Court decisions
regarding the child’s eligibility for SIJS when one fit parent is involved in the child’s life).
123
Compare Dep’ts of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat. 2440 (1997) (requiring the SIJS
applicant to be eligible “for long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment”),
with William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
(TVPRA), Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (removing the long-term foster care requirement
in the SIJS statute); see also supra Part II.B–C (discussing the implication of the long-term
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of the SIJS statute result in outcome disparities between similarly situated
children in SIJS eligibility decisions.124 Further, state courts fail to consider
the harm that families experience when a child is denied “special
findings” to petition the USCIS for SIJS.125
First, Part III.A analyzes congressional intent with TVPRA 2008’s
deliberate change in language to the 1997 SIJS Amendment. 126 Next, Part
III.B evaluates the inadequacy of current SIJS proposals. 127 Finally, Part
III.C examines the narrow interpretations of SIJS post-TVPRA 2008, and
argues that the federal and state government should follow the New York
interpretation of SIJS.128
A. Judicial Reliance: The 1997 Congressional Report under TVPRA 2008’s
“[one] or both” Standard
Though TVPRA 2008 is primary authority, courts such as Nebraska’s
Supreme Court, continue to rely on the 1997 Congressional Report for its
narrow interpretation. 129 Despite reliance on the 1997 Congressional
Report to deny eligible SIJS applicants, the 1997 SIJS Amendment was not
all bad.130 One of the benefits of the 1997 SIJS Amendment was that it
correctly included the requirement that the child be the victim of abuse,

foster care requirement and the modification of the language to “viability of reunification
with [one] or both parents” in TVPRA 2008).
124
See supra notes 24, 28, 101, 108 (comparing the differing interpretations of the California,
Maryland, New York and Nebraska courts on SIJS eligibility and the states’ role in the SIJS
process); see, e.g., In re Welfare of D.A.M., No. A12-0427, 2012 WL 6097225, at *3 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 10, 2012) (holding that children in the custody of one parent are eligible for SIJS).
125
See JUNCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 3-11 (recognizing that once undocumented children
petition the court for SIJS, they alert authorities that they are undocumented in the United
States); Yahner, supra note 85, at 781 (stating that children are allowed to petition the United
States for relief from deportation).
126
See infra Part III.A (advocating for TVPRA 2008’s expansion of the pool of children
eligible to receive SIJS).
127
See infra Part III.B (evaluating the inadequacy of current SIJS proposals).
128
See infra Part III.C (analyzing the impact of the New York and Nebraska court
interpretations of SIJS).
129
See H.R. REP. NO. 105-405, at 130 (1997) (pointing out the concern that children would
seek the benefit for immigration purposes). This SIJS congressional report receives
considerable deference, however, a conference report from the House of Representatives or
an interoffice memorandum is merely a type of secondary, non-binding authority. AMY E.
SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH: TOOLS AND STRATEGIES 5 (5th Ed. 2012). “Secondary
authority . . . is always persuasive . . . once you identify an authority as secondary, you can
be certain that it will not control the outcome of the issue[.] An authority is either part of
‘the law,’ or it is not.” Id. Therefore, the 1997 Congressional Report is neither a part of the
law, nor does it have the authority to control the outcome of SIJS determinations. Id.
130
See supra Part II.B (discussing the 1997 SIJS Amendment and the requirements placed
on SIJS applicants).
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abandonment, or neglect.131 Before the 1997 SIJS Amendment, some
children could abuse the remedy because the intent was implied, but not
expressed.132 In expressly stating the three categories of children eligible
for the SIJS remedy, the statute eliminated any confusion as to the
intended beneficiaries.133
However, the 1997 SIJS Amendment unnecessarily placed some
lengthy and burdensome tasks on children who needed immediate
relief.134 The added long-term foster care requirement forced children
who have been abused, abandoned, or neglected to go into the foster care
system.135 Additionally, the 1997 SIJS Amendment created the issue of
“aging-out” of the system before the children were able to receive SIJS.136
The 1997 SIJS Amendment contradicted the purpose of providing
adequate relief for the abused, neglected, and abandoned children,
because it created obstacles, confusion, and further trauma to victimized
children.137
Furthermore, the continued reliance on the 1997 Congressional Report
by judicial and administrative naysayers is the largest problem with the

131
Compare Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978 (requiring
that SIJS applicants be deemed eligible for long–term foster care), with Dep’ts of Commerce,
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriates Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119,
§ 113, 111 Stat. 2440 (1997) (requiring that SIJS applicants be deemed for long–term foster
care due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment). The 1997 SIJS Amendment attempted to
address the problem with children not in USCIS custody who were abusing the SIJS remedy.
Id.
132
See 1997 CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 130 (comparing the language of SIJS
1990 and 1997 SIJS Amendment as a means of achieving the goal to protect children who
may be endangered once returning to their native country).
133
See Lloyd, supra note 10, at 239 (describing Arizona Senator Domenici’s concerns of
abuse from non-detained juveniles, and congressional response in the 1997 SIJS
Amendment).
134
See Anderson, supra note 11, at 671 (reporting that the 1997 SIJS Amendment required
some children to stay in the foster system for up to eighteen months); see also Maria Virginia
Martorell, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: Problems with Substantive Immigration Law and
Guidelines for Improvement, SSRN at 17 (Jan. 18, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1832043 [http://perma.cc/E7CD-P77W] (observing that under the
1997 SIJS Amendment, children needed a final order issued for long-term foster care which
could take eighteen months for the SIJS process to begin).
135
See Lloyd, supra note 10, at 244 (stating that “the INS will seek revocation of any juvenile
court dependency order issued for a detained alien juvenile as such juveniles are not eligible
for long-term foster care because of their federal detention”).
136
See supra note 62 and accompanying text (addressing the “aging out” issue created by
1997 SIJS Amendment).
137
See Lloyd, supra note 10, at 246 (quoting Special Immigrant Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 42843,
42847 (1993)) (confirming that Congress contradicted its own 1993 statement that “it would
be both impractical and inappropriate for the Service to routinely readjudicate judicial or
social service agency administrative determinations”).
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1997 SIJS Amendments.138 The 1997 SIJS Amendments do not state that
SIJS petitions may be denied on the basis of failure to state a claim that is
not bona fide, yet many SIJS petitions are denied for this reason. 139 The 1997
Congressional Report is not controlling, but persuasive at best.140
Therefore, the USCIS and state governments that want to narrowly
construe the statute are placing too much deference on the 1997
Congressional Report.141
Federal and state governments that narrowly construe the current SIJS
statute argue that the statute is ambiguous, and therefore can rely on

See H.R. REP. NO. 105-405, at 130 (considering the birth of the bona fide petition
requirement). The 1997 Congressional Report states that the language was modified to
ensure that “neither the dependency order nor the administrative or judicial determination
of the alien’s best interest was sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, rather than for the purpose of obtaining
relief from abuse or neglect.” Id.
139
See Dep’ts of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat. 2440 (1997) (discussing the 1997 SIJS
Amendment). The text of the 1997 SIJS Amendment reads as follows:
(J) an immigrant who is present in the United States—
(i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located
in the United States or whom such a court has legally committed
to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a
State and who has been deemed eligible by that court for long-term
foster care due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment;
(ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial
proceedings that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be
returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality
or country of last habitual residence; and
(iii) in whose case the Attorney General expressly consents to the
dependency order serving as a precondition to the grant of special
immigrant juvenile status; except that—
(I) no juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine the
custody status or placement of an alien in the actual or
constructive custody of the Attorney General unless the
Attorney General specifically consents to such jurisdiction;
and
(II) no natural parent or prior adoptive parent of any alien
provided special immigrant status under this subparagraph
shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any
right, privilege, or status under this Act.
Id. The statute does not state any “bona fide” petition requirement, yet it is interpreted to
deny SIJS applicants. In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 647 (Neb. 2012).
140
See SLOAN, supra note 129, at 5 (maintaining that congressional reports are non-binding
sources of authority).
141
See id. (declaring that congressional reports should receive less deference when
compared to actual statutes). Secondary sources of authority do not control the outcomes of
issues, especially when TVPRA 2008 is binding authority demonstrating an intent to depart
from the 1997 SIJS Amendment. Id.
138
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legislative history.142 This reliance conflicts with Congress’ deliberate
replacement of terms like “long-term foster care” with “reunification with
one or both parents is not viable.”143 A plain meaning approach to the
current SIJS statute suggests that a child who cannot reunite with at least
one parent due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment is eligible for SIJS.144
This plain meaning analysis does not minimize a child’s experiences based
on discretion, but focuses on SIJS eligibility for a child victim. 145
Additionally, TVPRA 2008 is better tailored to the issues that SIJS
Due to the increasing number of
applicants currently face.146
unaccompanied children entering the United States annually, the political
concern is that children are in greater danger of becoming the victim of
human trafficking and child endangerment.147
Though TVPRA 2008 advanced the limiting and restricting nature of
the 1997 SIJS Amendment, the current statute still has its flaws: (1) the
terms abuse, abandonment, and neglect are not defined; and (2) the “one
or both” requirement is not clear, and thus allows for differing
interpretations.148 Since its enactment, legal scholars have advocated for
uniformity in the terms abuse, abandonment, and neglect.149 The current
142
See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing Nebraska’s argument that TVPRA 2008’s changes to the
SIJS statute are ambiguous, thus the court is able to use the 1997 Congressional Report for
guidance).
143
See RUTH SULLIVAN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 49 (2d ed. 2007) (“In practice, the
ordinary meaning is presumed to be the meaning intended by the legislature and, in the
absence of a reason to reject it, it should be adopted by the court.”).
144
See JUNCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 3-4 (“[T]he statute appears to provide SIJS eligibility
on the basis of the non-viability of reunification with one parent due to abuse, neglect or
abandonment, even while the child remains in the care of the other parent or while the court
is actively trying to reunite the child with the other parent.”).
145
See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302–03 (1993) (acknowledging that lower courts have
held that children have fundamental rights when dealing with government placement in
immigration matters); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (weighing the states’
competing interests in preserving and promoting the welfare of children and reduction in
burden and cost to the state); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (observing
the necessity for states to be accurate and just in the decisions made with children).
146
See supra note 42 and accompanying text (conveying the political concern of visiting
college students abusing SIJS 1990).
147
See, e.g., David Gonzalez, When American Dream Leads to Servitude, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/24/nyregion/24citywide.html [http://perma.
cc/R28K-JQT5] (rendering the number of human trafficking victims in the United States is
unascertainable); Gen. Charles C. Krulak, A New Slavery, 150 Years Later, HUFF. POST (Apr.
22, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-krulak/a-new-slavery-150-years-l_b_
6713702.html [http://perma.cc/6JB2-W43U] (equating human trafficking for women and
children as the new form of slavery).
148
See infra Part III.C (discussing the New York and the Nebraska courts’ analysis of the
issues of TVPRA 2008 as a basis for different results).
149
See Anderson, supra note 11, at 680 (advocating for uniformity in the terms abuse,
abandonment, and neglect, and further guidance to the “[one] or both” requirement); Special
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system allows states to apply their own meanings; however, this does not
create a critical issue in the SIJS process because states’ definitions of
abuse, abandonment, and neglect are similar.150 The second issue is the
failure of TVPRA 2008 to clarify the “[one] or both” requirement, which
has allowed states to deem the statute ambiguous, and resulted in
inconsistencies.151 If the state applies a plain meaning reading to the
current SIJS statute, the removal of the long-term foster care requirement
demonstrates an intent to expand the pool of children eligible for SIJS.152
However, if one narrowly construes the statute, TVPRA 2008 justifies the
reliance on legislative history as a means to deny eligible children. 153
Therefore, TVPRA 2008 needs to be revised to address the ambiguity. 154
B. The Current SIJS Proposals are Inadequate in Ensuring the Best Interests of
the Child
The SIJS 2011 proposals were not adopted because they failed to
clarify or further guide TVPRA 2008.155 Similarly, President Obama’s
immigration plan is not narrowly tailored in addressing the needs of
Provisions for Immigrant Youth: A Model State Statute, supra note 79, at 7 (proposing definitions
to ambiguous terms in the current SIJS statute).
150
Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-705(3) (2015) (“When any person abandons and neglects
to provide for his or her spouse or his or her child or dependent stepchild for three
consecutive months or more, it shall be prima facie evidence of intent to violate” the
abandonment of a child or dependent stepchild), with N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(5)(a)
(McKinney 2013), which sets out New York’s abandonment definition as:
[A] child is “abandoned” by his parent if such parent evinces an intent
to forgo his or her parental rights and obligations as manifested by his
or her failure to visit the child and communicate with the child or
agency, although able to do so and not prevented or discouraged from
doing so by the agency. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, such
ability to visit and communicate shall be presumed.
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(5)(a) (McKinney 2013).
151
See Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The “Plain-Meaning Rule” and Statutory
Interpretation in the “Modern” Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1300–01 n.16 (1975)
(arguing that the plain meaning may not be “plain” to everyone). In a second circuit opinion,
Judge Learned Hand wrote that “there is no surer way to misread any document than to
read it literally.” Id. at 1301.
152
See Wendy Biddle, Let’s Make a Deal. Liability for “Use of a Firearm” When Trading Drugs
for Guns Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(C), 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 65, 94 n.182 (2003) (“[T]he plain meaning
of the statute trumps the legislative intent.”).
153
See supra Part II.D.2 (considering Nebraska’s narrow interpretation of SIJS to deny
Erick’s juvenile court order for relevant special findings).
154
See Junck, supra note 8, at 56 (stating that a plain meaning reading of the SIJS statute
reveals that the child is eligible for SIJS when “non-viability of reunification with one parent
due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment, even while the child remains in the care of the other
parent”).
155
See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (describing the failure of the SIJS 2011
proposals to advance the issues of TVPRA 2008).
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undocumented children, because it addresses relief for millions of
undocumented adults and children in the United States.156 Further,
President Obama’s proposal brought backlash toward immigrants and a
continuing lack of empathy for the millions of undocumented children.157
Representative Roby claims to understand the need for addressing
undocumented children in the United States; however, her proposal
merely lists immigration efforts that she feels should not be funded by
Congress.158 Nevertheless, Representative Roby’s plan may have been
purposefully introduced as a precursor for Representative Aderholt’s
proposal, which was released just days later.159 Of particular importance,
Section 302 of Representative Aderholt’s “Repeal Executive Amnesty Act
of 2015,” proposes to change the “[one] or both” language in the current
SIJS statute to “either of the immigrant’s parents.”160 If this Act is adopted,
the legislature will demonstrate a complete disregard of the trauma
experienced by undocumented children in the custody of one parent. 161
Having one parent present in a child’s life does not mean that the child
is protected from abuse, neglect, or abandonment. 162 Similarly, granting
SIJS for the child has no bearing of citizenship for their parent or parents;
but, denying a child because of the child’s custody status guarantees the
uncertainty of the child’s future.163 Instead, approving SIJS for the child
ensures that despite what happens to that “present parent,” the child
could receive lawful permanent residency, saving them from abuse,

156
See Parlapiano, supra note 75 (reviewing President Obama’s immigration plan to allow
undocumented immigrants that have been present in the United States for five or more years
to receive lawful permanent residency status).
157
See Shabad & Marcos, supra note 79 (conveying that the House of Representatives
passed a bill to defund President Obama’s immigration plan).
158
See Press Release, Roby, supra note 77 (analyzing Representative Roby’s Prevention of
Executive Amnesty Act of 2015). Representative Roby stated that President Obama’s
immigration plan is irresponsible, and urges the House not to support his plan. Id. The
problem is that Representative Roby’s proposal does not give a solution to the problem, but
merely advocates against President Obama’s plan. Id.
159
See supra notes 77–78 (evaluating state representatives’ immigration proposals).
160
See supra note 78 and accompanying text (describing Representative Roby’s proposal to
the SIJS statute).
161
See Junck, supra note 8, at 49 (stating that many undocumented children travel to the
United States as an infant or young child, growing up nearly entirely in the United States
and considering the United States as their only home). These children may experience severe
conditions such as poverty, simply because their parents are undocumented. Id. at 49–50.
162
See Thronson, supra note 16, at 61, 66–67 (revealing that immigrant children are more
likely to experience poverty and barriers to public benefits than the average American child).
163
See supra note 138 and accompanying text (confirming that the child’s SIJS status does
not confer any special privileges or benefits to the parents or other close relatives of the
child).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 [2015], Art. 6

214

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

neglect, or abandonment.164 The SIJS’s intent is to protect the child from
disastrous conditions, not to abandon that child because of fear of
encouraging “illegal” immigration and pursuing deportations.165
Fordham Law School recognized the inadequacy of the current SIJS
proposals and sent statements to the U.S. House of Representative Judicial
Committee opposing efforts to narrowly interpret the SIJS statute. 166 In an
attempt to rectify the problem, the Fordham Law School prepared a Model
State Statute that proposes the use of uniformity and flexibility across state
lines.167 These combative efforts demonstrate the importance of creating
legislation that considers the best interests of the undocumented child.168
Similarly, other proposals from the U.S. House of Representatives and
legal scholars highlight the need for reform in the current SIJS statute.169
164
See Junck, supra note 8, at 58 (determining that it is not in a child’s best interest to be
returned to his or her native country because some children have spent the majority of their
lives in the United States, making them unfamiliar with the customs and language of their
native country).
165
See Lloyd, supra note 10, at 238–39 n.10 (discussing the division of INS in the SIJS process
to protect the federal government’s focus of national security and the state’s role in deciding
the best interests of the child).
166
See Memorandum from Fordham Law School, supra note 79, at 1 (proclaiming that if
the House votes to strike the “reunification with [one] or both parents” language, and inserts
“who cannot be reunified with either of the immigrant’s parents” the law will be taking a
step backward in protecting vulnerable undocumented children). Additionally, Fordham
argues that this action could create a greater wedge in integrated immigration efforts with
the best interests of the child. Id. See also Memorandum from Safe Passage Project, supra note
53 (enunciating if the current SIJS statute were amended to restrict children in the custody of
one parent SIJS eligibility, the government would be removing the children from the only
safe place that the child has ever known, in the custody of that one parent).
167
See Special Provisions for Immigrant Youth: A Model State Statute, supra note 79, at 6
(stating the inadequacy of current SIJS law which defers to state law on the child’s best
interest, but allows the USCIS to make final determinations).
168
See id. (restating the purpose of SIJS to protect vulnerable children). Particularly,
Section 502 of the model statute proposes the following guidelines for the “[one] or both
parents” requirement:
a. A Juvenile Court may make a Non-Reunification Finding without
terminating any parental rights.
b. A Juvenile Court shall make a Non-Reunification Finding when it
determines that reunification with one or both parents is not viable due
to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under State law, even
when the Immigrant Youth is under the care of or may be able to reunite
with the other parent.
c.
A Non-Reunification Finding for SIJS purposes can be made based
on the acts or omissions of only one parent even when other state laws
and/or other proceedings require a finding against both parents.
Id. at 12.
169
See infra Part IV (proposing amendments to the current SIJS statute). Additionally,
consent is a barrier for undocumented children, as the USCIS has usurped the role of the
juvenile court in making final determinations for the best interests of the child. See Kids Will
Be Kids, supra note 63, at 1013.
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C. The Literal Reading Approach: New York versus Nebraska
Currently, state courts are divided as to how to apply the SIJS
statute.170 In Erick M., Nebraska narrowly construed the SIJS statute, and
limited the number of children eligible to petition the USCIS because Erick
failed to state a “bona fide” claim.171 This analysis is outside the statutory
defined scope for juvenile courts in SIJS matters. 172 Scholars criticized the
Nebraska decision because the court overstepped its statutorily defined
role described in the SIJS statute.173 Ultimately, the court denied Erick’s
request for special findings because the court believed that Erick’s request
was solely to achieve lawful permanent residency in the United States. 174
However, the state court cannot give consent in SIJS matters.175 The state
juvenile courts determine if the applicant meets the age, marriage,
viability of reunification with “[one] or both” parents, and the “abuse,
neglect, and abandonment” requirements.176 Nebraska’s ruling is invalid
because the court has no authority to grant consent that is statutorily
delegated to the DHS.177
170
See supra Part II.D.2 (analyzing the case, holding, and reasoning of two differing state
interpretations of the SIJS statute).
171
See supra Part II.D.2 (discussing Nebraska’s interpretation of the current SIJS statute).
172
See supra note 145 and accompanying text (focusing on the SIJS eligibility of a child
victim).
173
See, e.g., 3-35 Immigration Law and Procedure § 35.09(3)(a) (Matthew Bender 2013)
(“[T]he Nebraska court blurred the federal and state roles under the SIJ statute” which “has
the troubling effect of precluding the USCIS from applying its interpretation of the federal
statute to determine whether a youth would qualify in a particular case.”).
174
Compare 58 Fed. Reg. 42847 (Aug. 12, 1993) (reiterating congressional intent for state
juvenile courts to focus on the best interests of the child), with In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639,
648 (Neb. 2012) (denying Erick’s petition because he demonstrated that reunification with
his mother was not feasible). In the opinion, the Nebraska court explained that the “USCIS
will not consent to a petition for SIJ status if it was ‘sought primarily for the purpose of
obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, rather than for
the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect or abandonment.’” In re Eric M., 820
N.W.2d at 646.
175
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii) (2012) (“[I]n whose case the Secretary of Homeland
Security consents to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status.”).
176
Id. See also Anderson, supra note 11, at 684 (arguing that Nebraska’s decision was
influenced by outside factors). More specifically, “[t]he court’s decision was influenced by
the fact Erick was removed from his mother’s house due to his own actions and the lack of
apparent abuse or neglect from either of Erick’s parents.” Id.
177
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii) (delegating authority to the Secretary of Homeland
Security to grant consent of SIJS). A more sensible belief is that the court denied Erick’s
request because he was in custody for possession of alcohol as a minor, and while in the
rehabilitation center, he constantly attacked the staff. Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 642. State
courts and USCIS immigration officials have discretion to deny immigration relief based on
juvenile delinquency, which is what Nebraska should have done instead of ruling that Erick
did not meet the statutory requirements. Junck, supra note 8, at 55. Juvenile delinquency is
considered a serious adverse discretionary factor against that child in SIJS proceedings. Id.
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Additionally, the Nebraska Supreme Court minimized the effects that
abandonment has on a child, regardless of whether one parent is still
involved in the child’s life.178 The SIJS statute neither imposes a
requirement that a particular parent has to abuse, neglect, or abandon the
child, nor does the statute require a specific time frame for abuse,
abandonment, or neglect by that parent, for a child to receive SIJS.179
Ultimately, the court punished Erick for having at least one active parent
in his life, which is contrary to the best interests of the child.180 If the
Nebraska Supreme Court would have taken a plain meaning approach to
the SIJS statute, they would have found that Erick met the SIJS
requirements.181 A plain meaning approach to the statute would allow
SIJS eligibility for Erick even though he remains in the care of his
mother.182
In New York, the court determined that the children met the
preliminary determination of “special findings” and could petition the
USCIS for SIJS.183 The New York Supreme Court correctly took a plain
meaning approach to interpreting the SIJS statute because TVPRA 2008
demonstrates an intent by Congress to broaden the SIJS statute. 184 Even
178
See Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 647 (suggesting that consideration of reunification with the
absent parent is not necessary when the child is in the custody of a safe parent).
179
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). Additionally, in David C., the Nebraska Supreme Court states
that “[a]lthough § 43-104 specifies the 6 months preceding the filing of the petition as the
critical period of time during which abandonment must be shown, we have stated that this
statutory period need not be considered in a vacuum.” David C. v. Jerad F., 790 N.W.2d 205,
211 (Neb. 2010). This example illustrates Nebraska’s flexibility with the statutory
requirements, or lack thereof in Erick M. Id.
180
See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-457 § 253, 122 Stat. 5044 (amending the language of the current SIJS statute);
Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 648 (ruling that because Erick failed to demonstrate that reunification
with his mother was not feasible, he failed to meet the SIJS requirements).
181
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (listing the requirements for SIJS).
182
See 3-35 Immigration Law and Procedure, supra note 173, at § 35.09(3)(a) (maintaining
that Nebraska blurred the roles of the federal and state in deciding SIJS matters).
183
Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S., 112 A.D.3d 100, 115 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). See also In re
E.G., 2009 WL 2534556, at *3 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2009) (ruling that TVPRA 2008 allows a child to
petition the USCIS for SIJS even if there is a fit parent living abroad, so long as the minor has
been abused, neglected or abandoned by one parent). In re Mario S. supports this
interpretation holding that although the child could be returned to his mother, he was
abandoned by his father. 954 N.Y.S.2d 843, 851 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2012). “The fact that
respondent was returned to the care of his mother should not be determinative of his
application for SIJ findings.” Id.
184
See Plain Meaning Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2009) (defining the plain
meaning rule: “[t]he doctrine that if a legal text is unambiguous it should be applied by its
terms without recourse to policy arguments, legislative history, or any other matter
extraneous to the text unless doing so would lead to an absurdity”). The plain meaning rule
is derived from case law “where the language of an enactment is clear, and construction
according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the words
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the Nebraska Supreme Court agrees that TVPRA 2008’s language
demonstrates an expansion to the pool of eligible children for SIJS.185
Further, immigration advocates believed that TVPRA 2008 ended the
requirement that both parents had to be absent from the child’s life to
receive SIJS.186 Therefore, New York correctly interpreted the SIJS statute
as expanding the number of children eligible to receive SIJS.187
The New York Supreme Court’s interpretation of the current SIJS
statute is correct because it solely analyzed the statutorily defined factors
assigned to juvenile courts in the SIJS process.188 The state’s role is to focus
on the best interests of the child, and determining whether the child stated
a “bona fide” claim distorts that purpose. 189 Additionally, the New York
Supreme Court understood that children seeking United States’ relief is a
humanitarian crisis, and a child should not be denied because of fear that
the child is abusing the SIJS remedy.190 The fear of abuse is not relevant
to this time period, considering the increasing number of undocumented
children entering the United States annually.191
Further, the New York Supreme Court recognizes that a child’s ability
to be reunited with one parent does not guarantee that the child will be

employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended.” Id. See also
CHRISTO BOTHA, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: AN INTRODUCTION FOR STUDENTS 28 (4th ed.
2005) (discussing the purpose of plain language drafting to convey ideas in a simple manner).
185
See Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 645 (interpreting TVPRA 2008 as an expansion to the pool
of children able to receive SIJS).
186
See Lee et al., supra note 60, at 3 (describing that “[t]he plain language of this statutory
revision says that family reunification need only be ‘not viable’ with one parent, not both
parents”).
187
See Marcelina M.-G., 112 A.D.3d at 110 (“We interpret the ‘[one] or both’ language to
provide SIJS eligibility where reunification with just one parent is not viable as a result of
abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar state law basis”). Further, the court notes that the
“possibility of reunification with one parent does not bar SIJS eligibility.” Id.
188
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012) (reaffirming that the state juvenile court’s role is to
determine whether it is in the child’s best interest to return to his or her native country). This
analysis is based on the question, whether “reunification with [one] or both of the
immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis
found under State law.” Id.
189
See 58 Fed. Reg. 42847 (Aug. 12, 1993) (explaining congressional intent for state juvenile
courts’ best interest determinations to be the final adjudication needed to determine SIJS);
supra Part II.D.2 (explaining the statutorily assigned role of the state government in the SIJS
process). Congress separated the roles in the SIJS process to allow states to determine the
best interests of the child, and the USCIS to grant consent. 58 Fed. Reg. 42847 (Aug. 12, 1993).
190
See Lloyd, supra note 10, at 243 (recognizing the major concern during the 1997 SIJS
Amendments was abuse by students who wanted to attend American colleges and
universities).
191
See Junck, supra note 8, at 50 (communicating TVPRA 2008’s intent to provide protection
to the thousands of unaccompanied minors that enter the United States annually).
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adequately provided for without a valid form of U.S. citizenship.192 Even
if a child can be reunited with one parent, the child needs documentation
to access benefits such as health care and social services. 193 By granting
undocumented children the right to free public education, the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized the lack of empathy for undocumented
children in the United States.194 The New York Supreme Court
comprehended the fact that allowing the child to receive “special
findings” to petition the USCIS for SIJS does not confer any special
benefits to the child’s parents. 195 Granting an undocumented child SIJS
will not give the parent legal status in the United States, but denying a
statutorily eligible undocumented child because he or she can be released
into the custody of one parent, punishes the child for the parent’s decision
of traveling to the United States.196 New York’s analysis of the SIJS statute
is correct because it focuses on the best interest of the child and does not
punish the child for their parents’ decisions. 197

192
See Thronson, supra note 16, at 69 (recognizing that undocumented children face a
number of challenges in the current immigration scheme because every aspect of
undocumented children’s rights are determined by their parents). This demonstrates a lack
of agency for undocumented children, often having their interest ignored in immigration
law purporting to be in the child’s best interest. Id.
193
See Junck, supra note 8, at 49–50 (disclosing that undocumented children are less likely
to have health insurance, and more likely to encounter barriers to accessing public benefits);
Thronson, supra note 16, at 77–78 (evaluating the barriers that undocumented children face
due to their parents decision to travel to the United States without proper documentation).
194
See, e.g., Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (“If the state is to deny a discrete group
of innocent children the free public education that it offers to other children residing within
its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state
interest.”). The case derived from a Texas School Board decision to exclude children from
public schools if they could not establish that they were legally admitted to the United States.
Id. at 206. The Court recognized that the children were innocent bystanders and should not
be subject to discrimination. Id. at 230. However, the dissent argues that it is not the job of
the Court to remedy every social ill and failings of the political system. Id. at 253 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
195
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II) (2012) (stating that “no natural parent or prior
adoptive parent of any alien provided special immigrant status under this subparagraph
shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under
this chapter”); Mai, supra note 36, at 253 (reasserting that that parents, siblings, or family
members cannot collaterally benefit from a relative receiving SIJS).
196
See supra note 192 and accompanying text (revealing the undocumented child’s lack of
agency in immigration matters despite the alleged best interest focus).
197
See Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S., 112 A.D.3d 100, 115 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (determining
that it would not be in the child’s best interest to be returned to their native country); see also
supra note 41 and accompanying text (confirming the purpose of vesting state courts with
the power to make preliminary SIJS determinations).
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In Marcelina, reunification with the children’s mother did not preempt
the court from ruling the children met the SIJS statutory requirements. 198
Additionally, the Marcelina court recognized the difference in statutory
interpretation and rightfully criticized the Erick M. court for its narrow
interpretation.199 First, the New York Supreme Court reasoned that even
if the Nebraska Supreme Court found the statute ambiguous, the federal
statutory construction requires the ambiguity to be read in favor of the
immigrant child, which the Nebraska court failed to do. 200 Second, the
New York Supreme Court critiqued the Nebraska Supreme Court’s failure
to consider the dangers that Erick will face as a result of being deported to
his native country and away from his fit parent.201 Ultimately, the New
York Court placed the best interests of the child in its analysis while the
Nebraska Court failed to consider the best interests of Erick.202
The Nebraska Supreme Court’s interpretation is deeply flawed and
does not account for the best interests of the child. 203 Considering this
issue, this Note proposes a definitive standard to guide the states in using
New York’s approach as a guideline and to minimize outcome
disparities.204 Amending ambiguous terms in the current SIJS statute will
198
Marcelina M.-G., 112 A.D.3d at 115. The court analyzed the abandonment from the
children’s father and allowed SIJS even though the mother petitioned the court for sole
custody and a SIJS juvenile court order. Id. at 114. In both Erick M. and Marcelina, the
children had a suitable mother upon which the court could release them into safe and stable
custody. Compare In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 648 (Neb. 2012) (denying Erick’s petition
because his mother was an active part of his life and present during the judicial proceedings,
although she did not petition the court), with Marcelina M.-G., 112 A.D.3d at 115 (granting
the motion to petition the USCIS even though the child’s mother petitioned the court for
special findings of SIJS eligibility).
199
See Marcelina M.-G., 112 A.D.3d at 112–13 (critiquing the Nebraska Supreme Court for
making determinations beyond the scope of juvenile courts in the SIJS application process).
200
See id. (explaining the purpose of ruling statutory ambiguities in favor of the child
immigrant); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (supporting flexibility
in ambiguous immigration statutes that have the potential of deporting the immigrant into
a dangerous environment); Yu v. Brown, 92 F.Supp.2d 1236, 1248 (D.N.M. 2000) (ruling that
ambiguities within immigration statutes must be interpreted in favor of the immigrant).
201
Marcelina M.-G., 112 A.D.3d at 113. The court weighs the alternative of granting special
findings which is to “render[] the fact that the child has a fit parent in the United States
immaterial.” Id.
202
See Anderson, supra note 11, at 692 (concluding that Erick was punished for finding
“stability” with his mother after his father abandoned him at the age of one). Anderson also
writes that the Nebraska Supreme Court was influenced by the fact that Erick was in
rehabilitation for his own actions and not as a direct result of abuse from his parents. Id. at
684. This view fails to consider the effect that the abandonment from Erick’s father has
contributed to his current mental state. Id.
203
See supra notes 39 & 41 and accompanying text (stating the purpose of dividing the SIJS
process to ensure that national security concerns do not trump the best interests of the child).
204
See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to the SIJS statute to clarify the ambiguities
and remove the need to rely on the 1997 Congressional Report).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 [2015], Art. 6

220

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

decrease reliance on the limiting and restricting nature of the 1997 SIJS
Amendment.205 Additionally, there is no provision in the actual statute
that encourages denial of SIJS because of a non bona fide claim.206 Further,
the 1997 Congressional Report is persuasive, non-binding authority, while
the SIJS statute is primary mandatory authority.207 Allowing state courts
and the USCIS to rely on this form of legislative history conflicts with the
purpose of TVPRA 2008. The focus of SIJS should be on the victim and
not political views of a distant Congress.208
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Jurisdictional splits, such as the one presented above, are detrimental
to the notions of fairness, trust, and equality in the judicial system.209 This
inconsistent application of SIJS must be resolved to minimize the outcome
disparities for SIJS applicants.210 Part IV.A introduces the proposed SIJS
amendments.211 Then, Part IV.B includes commentary to the suggested
amendments.212
A. Guideline Amendments: SIJS Revised to Comply with New York’s Plain
Meaning Interpretation
New York utilizes the plain meaning standard for granting “special
findings” to SIJS applicants.213 This uniform standard is the best choice
given the necessary balancing of the inherent strengths and weaknesses of
both standards.214 Due to TVPRA 2008’s amendment to the language of
the SIJS statute, statutory construction and interpretation issues will

205
See supra Part II.B (reviewing 1997 SIJS Amendment with respect to the political
concerns).
206
See supra Part III.A (comparing TVPRA 2008 to the limiting and restricting nature of the
1997 SIJS Amendment, specifically the 1997 Congressional Report).
207
See supra Part III.A (explaining the legal effect of primary and mandatory authority).
208
See supra Part II.D.2 (considering the different outcomes derived from the same SIJS
statute in the current scheme).
209
See supra Part III.C (demonstrating the effect of differing statutory interpretations).
210
See supra Part II.D.2 (demonstrating the outcome disparities for similarly situated
children in different states).
211
See infra Part IV.A (proposing amendments to the “[one] or both” requirement and
providing uniformity in the terms abuse, neglect, and abandonment).
212
See infra Part IV.B (explaining the importance of the suggested amendments from Part
IV.A).
213
See supra note 124 and accompanying text (describing the states with different statutory
interpretations of the SIJS statute and the varying outcome of the interpretations).
214
See supra Part III.C (contesting the plain meaning approach taken by the New York
Supreme Court).
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continue.215 The courts and the USCIS should attempt to give the words
their full effect, as they were deliberately inserted by Congress. 216 Thus, a
plain meaning approach is the best choice; however, because the plain
meaning is not “plain” to everyone, the current SIJS statute should be
amended to conform to the New York Supreme Court’s current statutory
interpretation.217
The SIJS statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J), should first be amended to
clarify the meaning of “[one] or both.” Second, the revised SIJS statute
should add definitions to “neglect,” “abuse,” and “abandonment” to
direct courts to focus on the intent of the legislature in expanding the pool
of applicants eligible for the benefit. The language of the proposed statute
is as follows:
(J) An immigrant who is present in the United States—
(i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile
court located in the United States or whom such
a court has legally committed to, or placed under
the custody of, an agency or department of a
State, or an individual or entity appointed by a
State or juvenile court located in the United
States, and whose reunification with [one] or
both of the immigrant’s parents, even if the child
can be reunited with the other parent, is not viable
due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar
basis found under State law;
(I) Definitions for State Uniformity
(a) Abuse—Abused child means a child less than
eighteen years of age whose parent or other person
legally responsible for his or her care: (1) Inflicts
or allows to be inflicted upon such child mental or
physical injury by other than accidental means
that causes or creates a substantial risk of death,
serious or protracted disfigurement, protracted
215
See supra Part III.C (debating Nebraska’s interpretation that the current SIJS statute
allows courts to decide if they want to determine the best interests of the child in the context
of “[one] or both” parents).
216
See supra Part III.A (analyzing the replacement of the “long-term foster care”
requirements with the “[one] or both” parents language).
217
See supra note 149 and accompanying text (explaining the problem with the plain
meaning approach). Everyone does not view the statute in the same “plain” way. Id.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 [2015], Art. 6

222

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

impairment of physical or emotional health, or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily organ; or (2) Creates or allows to be
created a substantial risk of mental or physical
injury to such child by other than accidental
means that would be likely to cause death, serious
or
protracted
disfigurement,
protracted
impairment of physical or emotional health, or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily organ.
(b) Neglect—Neglected child means a child less
than age eighteen whose physical, mental, or
emotional condition has been impaired or is in
imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result
of the failure of his or her parent or other person
legally responsible for his or her care to exercise a
minimum degree of care: (1) In supplying the
child with adequate food, clothing, shelter,
education, or medical or surgical care, although
financially able to do so or offered financial or
other reasonable means to do so; (2) In providing
the child with proper supervision or
guardianship; (3) By unreasonably inflicting or
allowing harm to be inflicted, or a substantial risk
thereof, including the infliction of excessive
corporal punishment; (4) By misusing drugs or
alcoholic beverages to the extent that he or she
loses self-control of his or her actions; or (5) By
any other acts of a similarly serious nature
requiring the aid of the court.
(c) Abandonment—A child is abandoned by his
parent if such parent evinces an intent to forego
his or her parental rights and obligations as
manifested by his or her failure to visit the child
and communicate with the child or agency,
although able to do so and not prevented or
discouraged from doing so by the agency. In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, such ability to
visit and communicate shall be presumed.218

The state law definition was taken from New York’s Social Services. N.Y. SOC. SERV.
LAW § 371 (4)(a)–(b), § 384-b (5)(a) (2012).
218
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(ii) for whom it has been determined in
administrative or judicial proceedings that it
would not be in the alien’s best interest to be
returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous
country of nationality or country of last habitual
residence; and
(iii) in whose case the Secretary of Homeland
Security consents to the grant of special
immigrant juvenile status, except that—
(I) no juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine
the custody status or placement of an alien in the
custody of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services unless the Secretary of Health and
Human Services specifically consents to such
jurisdiction; and
(II) no natural parent or prior adoptive parent of
any alien provided special immigrant status under
this subparagraph shall thereafter, by virtue of
such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege,
or status under this chapter.219
B. Commentary
TVPRA 2008 should first be amended to clarify that having one parent
present does not preclude the child from being the victim of abuse,
neglect, or abandonment.220 Children should not be punished for having
only one active parent in their life, and further explaining the “[one] or
both” language will prevent this problem. Though the “[one] or both”
language arguably causes differing interpretations amongst the states,
since each state has different definitions of abuse, abandonment, and
neglect, the statute should provide definitions for all of those terms to
create uniformity in application of the SJIS statute.221 By amending the
language to address these differences in definitions and state
interpretations, the guidelines will set forth a uniform standard for state
219
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012); the italicized portion of the statute is the contribution of
the author.
220
See supra Part III.B (discussing the detrimental effects on children enduring the current
SIJS process, dependent upon the state where the child is located).
221
See supra Part III.C (demonstrating the inadequacy of allowing states to defer to their
own definitions and interpretations for the SIJS statute).
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juvenile courts.222 This standard properly focuses on the negative impacts
of permitting differing state interpretations of the same language, and
thus will aid courts in alleviating those harms through allowing eligible
children to petition the USCIS for SIJS.223 Mandating this standard will
help ensure that courts no longer apply inconsistent standards across
jurisdictions, resulting in outcome disparities.224
Critics will argue that the proposed amendment will fail because the
language “[one] or both” can be reasonably interpreted to mean that state
courts have discretion in determining that if the child is in the custody of
one fit parent, the abandonment, abuse, or neglect of the missing parent is
irrelevant. The proposed amendment addresses this argument because
the application of a consistent standard will dramatically decrease
disparity and better achieve the goals of ensuring that all children asking
family courts for special findings to petition the USCIS for SIJS are treated
equally.225
Additionally, critics will argue that state courts should have discretion
in deciding if a child meets SIJS requirements. This criticism is flawed
because the proposed amendment allows courts to determine if the child
meets the current SIJS requirements, without overstepping their
boundaries and making decisions statutorily granted to the USCIS. The
USCIS has the power of consent, and state courts analysis should focus on
determining if the applicant has been abused, abandoned, or neglected.226
V. CONCLUSION
Following Congress’ departure from the long-term foster care
standard articulated in the 1997 SIJS Amendment, state courts use wide
discretion in interpreting the intent of Congress. In doing so, courts fail to
effectuate the purposes underlying the SIJS statute and effectively combat
the abuse, abandonment, and neglect that these children experience. In
applying the varying “[one] or both” standards, courts created outcome
disparities between similarly situated children, which is contrary to the
SIJS goals of uniformity. To solve this continuing issue in SIJS statutory
interpretation, the SIJS statute must undergo further amendment to create
a uniform standard. Defining abuse, neglect, and abandonment, and
222
See supra Part IV.A (proposing guidelines to assist state juvenile courts in determining
SIJS eligibility).
223
See supra Part III.B (discussing the issues of allowing differing state interpretations).
224
See supra Part III.B (explaining the harm done to Erick as a result of the state lacking
uniformity in applying the SIJS statute).
225
See supra Part III.B (displaying the disparities in application of the current SIJS statute).
226
See supra Part II.C–D (describing the current SIJS process and the roles of the state and
federal court).
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further clarifying the “[one] or both language” will ensure uniformity
among the states.
Applying this proposed amendment to the two brothers from
Guadalajara would change the course of the brothers’ future. If there was
a uniform standard, the fact that the boys could be reunited with their
father would not preclude the Nebraska court from granting them special
findings for SIJS. Nebraska would stay within its statutorily defined role
of making a preliminary determination, and the brothers would have the
chance to petition the USCIS for SIJS. Thus, the proposed amendment will
ensure equal treatment for similarly situated children and minimize
unwarranted disparities.
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